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Abstract
We study optimal monetary policy in a two-country currency union model with nominal and
nancial frictions. In addition to, and independent from, the standard transmission mechanism
associated with sticky prices, nancial frictions combined with asymmetric asset positions intro-
duce a wealth redistribution role for monetary policy in our model. Financial frictions also lead
to a spread between the deposit and borrowing interest rate and variation in the spread a¤ects
both aggregate variables, by a¤ecting total spending, and relative (cross-country) variables, by
redistributing wealth across countries. Moreover, the interactions between nominal and nancial
frictions amplify the e¤ects of monetary policy; imply that a strict ination targeting policy of
setting union-wide ination to zero is never optimal and that optimal policy never attains e¢ -
ciency; and lead to a novel policy trade-o¤ for the central bank in stabilizing relative consumption
versus the relative price gap (the deviation of relative prices from their e¢ cient level). Finally,
under optimal monetary policy, in response to an aggregate purely nancial shock that causes an
increase in the interest rate spread, the central bank strongly decreases the deposit rate, which
reduces aggregate and distributional ine¢ ciencies by mitigating the drop in output and ination
and the rise in relative consumption and prices. We also show that while a traditional Taylor rule
approximates optimal policy imperfectly, especially in response to the nancial shock, a spread-
adjusted Taylor rule performs better as it helps the real interest rate track the e¢ cient rate of
interest.
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1 Introduction
The recent global nancial crisis has led to a renewed interest in incorporating nancial frictions
in business cycle models used in positive and normative analysis of monetary policy.1 Much of
this recent work, especially the subset that analyzes normative implications, has been done in the
context of closed economy models of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. In this paper,
we take an open economy approach and study optimal monetary policy in a two-country model
of the currency union with nominal rigidities and nancial imperfections. Distinguishing features
of our model are asymmetric net wealth positions across member countries in the currency union,
incomplete risk-sharing within the union, and a spread between borrowing and deposit interest rates.
In analyzing optimal monetary policy in a currency union with such features, we are especially
motivated by imbalances in net asset positions among Euro Area countries (as is evident from Table
1 below which presents Net International Investment Position as a ratio of GDP for selected Euro
Area Countries) coupled with recent developments such as the nancial crisis and the rapid increase
in interest rate spreads during the crisis (as is evident from Figure 1 below which presents the excess
returns on the 10-year government bond of selected Euro Area countries over the 10-year German
Bund yield).2 We believe that our theoretical results will help shed light on the normative policy
implications of these developments for the European Central Bank.
Table 1: Net International Investment Position as a ratio of GDP (%) in the Euro Area
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010
France -1.6 -12.2 -9.5 -10.6
Germany 28.5 23.6 35.8 37.8
Greece -103.4 -72.7 -89.5 -97.6
Ireland -21.0 -68.0 -101.3 -96.6
Italy -26.3 -22.8 -26.7 -24.7
Portugal -95.4 -90.9 -114.9 -109.1
Spain -83.9 -75.0 -95.4 -88.6
Source: IMF Balance of Payments data
Our currency union model is a standard two-country setup similar to Benigno (2004) where mo-
nopolistically competitive rms produce di¤erentiated goods using labor and set prices at stochastic
intervals, as in Calvo (1983). The production function is subject to both an aggregate and a country-
specic productivity shock. Representative households in the two countries consume a bundle of the
home and foreign goods, provide labor to home rms, make borrowing and saving decisions, and
1 Important recent contributions to the literature include, among others, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2009),
Curdia and Woodford (2009, 2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Del Negro et al (2011). Well-known precursors
to this literature are Townsend (1979), Williamson (1987), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). Finally, Kiyotaki
and Gertler (2010) provide both a canonical model to study credit policies and a literature survey.
2For evidence on the crucial role played by credit spreads in U.S. business cycle uctuations generally, see Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2012) and for the recent crisis specically, see see Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012).
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Figure 1: Interest rate spreads in the Euro Area (Source: OECD data)
receive prots from home rms and union-wide nancial intermediaries.3
In this prototypical set-up, we allow for asymmetric initial and steady-state wealth position
across the countries, with one country a borrower and the other a saver.4 We then add two sources
of nancial imperfections. First, the only nancial instrument that is traded across countries in
the currency union is a non-state contingent nominal bond that is in zero net supply. The lack of
a complete set of state-contingent securities that can be traded across countries thus means that
cross-country risk-sharing is incomplete within the union. Second, there are frictions in nancial
intermediation that lead to a spread between the deposit and borrowing rates. To keep our set-up
tractable and easily comparable with the literature, we adopt the modelling framework of Curdia and
Woodford (2009, 2010) in introducing these frictions. Perfectly competitive nancial intermediaries
that operate union-wide accept deposits and lend to households. Origination of loans is costly and
consumes real resources as a function of the real quantity of loans. This implies that the interest
rate spread varies endogenously as aggregate debt evolves in the economy. In addition, we also
allow for an exogenous loss rate of loans that varies over time. This then constitutes an aggregate
3For simplicity and to make clear our contributions to the literature on monetary policy in a currency union (in
particular, to highlight the role of nancial frictions in isolation), the model abstracts from some potentially important
sources of ex-ante heterogeneity between member countries, for example, in preferences, shock processes, and the extent
of price stickiness. There is also no home bias in consumption.
4One country starts with positive wealth while the other starts with negative wealth (of the same amount). In the
non-stochastic steady state, the initial wealth positions will coincide with the steady-state ones: one country will have
positive wealth while the other will have negative. Moreover, for small enough shocks, in a rst-order approximation,
which is the case we consider, the nancial position of the countries will uctuate around these non-stochastic steady
state values. Thus one country is a borrower while the other a saver over the business cycle as well in our model.
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purely nancial shock that a¤ects the interest rate spread in our model. Importantly, variations in
interest rates and the spread a¤ect both aggregate variables, by a¤ecting aggregate demand, as well
as relative (cross-country) variables, by redistributing wealth over the business cycle between the
borrower and saver country.5
In this environment, our main contribution is to characterize optimal monetary policy of the
union-wide common central bank using a linear-quadratic approach, focussing in particular on the
role played by nancial frictions. Following Woodford (2003), we derive a quadratic welfare-theoretic
loss-function of the central bank by taking a second-order approximation of an equally-weighted sum
of the households utilities in the two countries around an e¢ cient non-stochastic steady-state.6 A
rst-order approximation of the private sectors optimality conditions as well as market-clearing
relations then represent the constraints faced by the central bank. We study this Ramsey problem
of minimizing the loss function subject to the constraints under commitment, where the policy
instrument is the deposit interest rate.
Our rst set of results concerns the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In our model,
nominal and nancial frictions lead to two di¤erent, and in principle independent, channels of mon-
etary policy transmission. Consider rst a version of our model with sticky prices but no initial
heterogeneity in wealth positions.7 Then, monetary policy has real e¤ects through the usual and
well-understood aggregate demand channel: monetary policy can a¤ect the (ex-ante) real interest
rate under sticky prices, which enables it to manage the aggregate, union-wide output gap (the de-
viation of output from the e¢ cient level). Moreover, in this case, monetary policy has no e¤ect at
all on cross-country variables like relative prices, consumption, and debt.
Consider next a version of our model without sticky prices, but with nancial frictions. Even with
exible prices, monetary policy has real e¤ects as it a¤ects the wealth distribution of the economy.
The channel for this is the following. Note that in a rst-order approximation of our model, one
country is always a borrower while the other is a saver. Moreover, the nancial instrument that
the countries trade in our model is a nominal bond. Then, if the central bank changes the deposit
rate, and thereby ination, it redistributes wealth between the countries.8 This redistribution of
wealth naturally a¤ects relative consumption and prices in the currency union. Under exible prices,
monetary policy however, does not a¤ect aggregate, union-wide output, which is determined solely
as a function of aggregate and country-specic productivity shocks.9 While these mechanisms are
5We use "relative" and "cross-country" interchangeably in the paper.
6 In the non-stochastic steady state, there is no interest rate spread and moreover, the distortion due to monopolistic
competition is removed through a non-state-contingent sales tax. In addition, in the steady-state, we allow for lump-
sum transfers across the countries such that they have the same level of consumption, even though their initial (and
steady state) net asset positions are not the same.
7A model with complete markets would also yield similar insights.
8For an inuential empirical study of the redistributive channel of monetary policy that operates through returns
on nominal bonds, see Doepke and Schneider (2006).
9Obviously, it is well understood that monetary policy does a¤ect relative prices even under complete asset markets,
for example, when the degree of nominal rigidities is di¤erent across countries as in Benigno (2004). Moreover, under
di¤erent model environments, reshu­ ing of consumption and prices between countries could a¤ect aggregate output,
which in turn further changes relative consumption and prices even under exible prices. For simplicity and to highlight
the main role of nominal and nancial frictions in isolation, we build our model in a way such that these feedback
channels are absent. Hence, monetary policy is neutral for cross-country variables in one special case (nominal frictions
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in principle independent, in our general model with both frictions, there is a non-trivial interaction
between monetary policy, aggregate dynamics, and evolution of cross-country variables, which leads
to a very interesting optimal monetary policy problem. In particular, these interactions lead to
a more persistent e¤ect of monetary policy on aggregate and relative variables, as well as a novel
trade-o¤ for policy that we discuss below.
Our second set of results is related to the terms that appear in the welfare-theoretic quadratic loss
function, which illustrate the various distortions present in the model. As is standard in models with
staggered price setting, since ination causes ine¢ cient price dispersion across di¤erentiated goods,
the loss function contains ination of the two countries. It also contains the union-wide output gap.
Moreover, as Benigno (2004) has also shown, in a currency union since countries e¤ectively have
a xed exchange rate and prices are sticky, the relative price gap, the deviation of relative (cross-
country) prices from their e¢ cient level, is also present in the loss function.10 The next two terms
are new to our set-up and arise because of nancial imperfections. First, because of imperfect risk-
sharing between the countries, relative consumption appears in the loss function. Second, because
nancial intermediation consumes real resources and the endogenous interest rate spread is a function
of aggregate debt, aggregate debt is also included in the loss function.
Our third set of results, which is the major focus of our paper, is regarding model dynamics under
optimal monetary policy and the policy trade-o¤s that the central bank faces. Before proceeding
to the general version of our model with both nominal and nancial frictions, it is instructive to
consider the two special cases that we discussed before where only one of the two transmission
mechanisms is in operation at a time. In particular, for these two special cases, we provide analytical
characterization of optimal policy.
So consider rst the well-understood case without any nancial frictions but with sticky prices,
where the transmission mechanism operates through the aggregate demand channel. In this case,
the central bank can only a¤ect aggregate output and ination and not any other cross-country
variables. Thus, the central banks loss function only contains ination and the output gap. Since,
our model does not feature ine¢ cient supply shocks  such as markup shocks  or cross-country
heterogeneity in price stickiness, there is no trade-o¤ in stabilizing ination versus the output gap.
Optimal monetary policy then constitutes full stabilization of ination, and thereby, of the output
gap. Such optimal policy however, does not attain the e¢ cient outcome since in the presence of
country-specic productivity shocks, the relative price gap is not zero and is in fact outside the
control of the central bank.
Next, consider the case without any sticky prices but with nancial frictions, where the transmis-
sion mechanism operates through the wealth redistribution channel. In this case, the central bank
cannot a¤ect aggregate output but can a¤ect cross-country variables. Thus, the central banks loss
function only contains relative consumption and debt.11 In the presence of the purely aggregate
only) while it is neutral for aggregate output in the other special case (nancial frictions only).
10Note that it is possible to also rewrite these rst four terms in the loss function in terms of union-wide ination,
union-wide output gap, the relative price gap, and the rst di¤erence of relative prices.
11Under exible prices, the central bank does not care about ination and while the central bank does care about
relative price gap variation, there is a one-to-one relationship between relative consumption and relative price gap.
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nancial shock, the central bank faces a trade-o¤ since it is not possible to simultaneously achieve
zero relative consumption and zero debt. This precludes optimal policy from attaining the e¢ cient
outcome.12 When a positive nancial shock hits and drives the interest rate spread upward, the
central bank optimally reduces the distributional ine¢ ciency arising due to the wealth redistribution
from the borrower to the saver country by decreasing the deposit rate and driving down the borrow-
ing countrys debt. The central bank thus conducts a "leaning against the wind" policy. Finally, in
stark contrast to the case of sticky prices, ination now responds to all shocks and in fact can be
quite volatile.
With results for the two specic cases established, it is easy to see that in our general model with
both nominal and nancial frictions, a strict ination targeting policy of setting union-wide ination
to zero is not optimal and that optimal policy does not attain the e¢ cient outcome. Our result is
thus in contrast with previous nding in Benigno (2004) that complete stabilization of union-wide
ination is optimal when the economy has no ine¢ cient supply shocks such as markup shocks 
and no cross-country heterogeneity in price stickiness. Note that this new result does not emerge
because there is a trade-o¤ between stabilizing aggregate ination and output gap in our model.
Rather, it holds because the other terms in the loss function, such as relative price gap, relative
consumption, and aggregate debt are not generally independent of monetary policy due to nancial
imperfections that lead to the wealth redistributive role of monetary policy. The central bank thus
has to optimally balance the variability of all the target variables, not just ination and output gap.
Moreover, there will generally be a trade-o¤ in mitigating aggregate vs. cross-country distortions.
For example, the central bank will not allow ination to uctuate as much to mitigate variations in
relative consumption when nominal frictions are present in addition to nancial frictions.
With country-specic productivity shocks, which lead to a movement in the e¢ cient level of
relative prices, the interaction of nominal and nancial frictions lead to a novel trade-o¤ for the
central bank in stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price gap. This trade-o¤ is in
addition to the one between relative consumption and debt that we discussed above. In the presence
of sticky prices and idiosyncratic productivity shocks, it is not possible to simultaneously achieve both
a zero relative consumption and a zero relative price gap. In the presence of nancial frictions, the
central bank also cares about variation in relative consumption. Thus, the interaction of nominal
and nancial frictions generates this new trade-o¤: if there were no nancial imperfections, then
relative consumption and relative price gap would evolve independently of monetary policy, thereby
precluding any role of policy; while if prices were completely exible, then there would be a one-to-one
relationship between relative consumption and relative price gap, thereby generating no trade-o¤ for
policy. The most important consequence of this new trade-o¤ is that in response to country-specic
productivity shocks, under optimal policy, the central bank allows for a higher variability in the
relative price gap compared to when there are no nancial imperfections, as it now also cares about
the variability in relative consumption.
Finally, in our general model, we analyze optimal policy in response to the purely aggregate
nancial shock that causes an increase in the interest rate spread. To counter this shock, the
12Note that debt and relative consumption do not respond to shocks other than the nancial shock.
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central bank strongly decreases the deposit interest rate, thereby mitigating the drop in output and
ination that would otherwise occur. All other target variables, that is, relative price gap, relative
consumption, and aggregate debt, uctuate in response to this shock as the shock redistributes wealth
between countries. In addition to decreasing aggregate uctuations, the central banks lowering of
the deposit rate also optimally reduces the distributional ine¢ ciency caused by wealth redistribution
as it mitigates the ine¢ cient rise in relative consumption and prices.
As our nal set of results, we provide a comparison of optimal policy with some simple instrument
rules such as a standard Taylor rule and a spread-adjusted Taylor rule. In most cases, the dynamics
look fairly similar between optimal policy and a simple Taylor rule, where the central bank adjusts
the deposit interest rate in response to only ination and output, even though clearly there is more
variability of the terms in the loss-function under a Taylor rule. The biggest di¤erence in model
dynamics between optimal policy and a simple Taylor rule is with respect to the aggregate purely
nancial shock. Under a simple Taylor rule, in response to this shock, the central bank allows a
substantial drop in output and ination, an outcome not observed under optimal policy. Moreover,
both relative consumption and price tend to deviate further away from their e¢ cient levels due to
the wealth redistribution e¤ect. It is precisely in this situation where a spread-adjusted Taylor rule,
in which the deposit rate also responds negatively to the interest rate spread, performs much better.
The main intuition for this result is that the interest rate spread a¤ects the e¢ cient rate of interest
in our model. Therefore, when the central bank reaction function includes the spread term, it helps
the real interest rate track the e¢ cient rate of interest better and improve on aggregate outcomes.
In addition, a spread-adjusted Taylor rule leads to better distributional outcomes. By lowering the
deposit rate, the central bank can (partially) reverse the ine¢ cient wealth redistribution caused by
an increase in the spread, and moderate ine¢ cient variations in relative consumption and prices.
Related Literature
Our paper builds on several strands of the literature. The core of our model is very similar to the
prototypical sticky price two-country model of a currency union introduced in an important paper
by Benigno (2004), whose main focus is on the characterization of optimal monetary policy when
the degree of price stickiness is di¤erent across the countries. Benigno (2004) makes a judicious use
of parameter value for the intra-termporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods to replicate complete markets outcome and thereby, abstracts from imperfect risk-sharing in
the currency union. Our paper, while abstracting from cross-country heterogeneity in price stickiness,
explores fully the e¤ects on optimal monetary policy of nancial frictions that lead to imperfect risk-
sharing, a spread between lending and deposit interest rates, and a wealth redistributive role for
monetary policy. While doing so, we provide new results that are complementary to and extend
those of Benigno (2004).
Our paper is also clearly related to the growing literature that introduces nancial frictions
in standard business cycle sticky price models. In particular, in modelling frictions in nancial
intermediation that lead to interest rate spreads, we use the set-up provided in closed-economy
models by Curdia and Woodford (2009, 2010). Our analysis of the nancial shock and the spread-
adjusted Taylor rule is also related to theirs. Our currency-union model however, provides new
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insights into the welfare-theoretic loss-function of the central bank and the policy trade-o¤s that
it confronts.13 In particular, the trade-o¤ between stabilizing the relative price gap and relative
consumption is new to our set-up.
In addition, we share with Erceg and Linde (2013), Faia (2007), and Gilchrist, Hairault, and
Kempf (2002), the goal of introducing nancial frictions in sticky price currency union models. They
use nancial frictions of the type pioneered by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and specify a Taylor
rule to model monetary policy. Our paper introduces frictions in nancial intermediation di¤erently
and more importantly, studies its implications for the conduct of optimal monetary policy.
Finally, our paper has some common elements with the models of Benigno (2009), De Fiorre,
Teles, and Tristani (2011), and De Fiorre and Tristani (2011, 2012). In a two-country model with
incomplete markets, Benigno (2009) allows for asymmetric initial wealth positions and studies its
implications for welfare loss if the central bank were to pursue a strict ination stabilization policy.
Benigno (2009) also emphasizes the role of monetary policy in generating valuation e¤ects, that is,
a¤ecting ex-post real returns on international assets.14 In a currency union setting we show that with
richer nancial frictions, in particular, the presence of an exogenous nancial shock and interest rate
spread, this wealth redistribution channel leads to a non-trivial optimal monetary policy problem.
We also clearly highlight how nominal and nancial frictions channel interact to lead to new policy
e¤ects and trade-o¤s.
De Fiorre, Teles, and Tristani (2011) analyze optimal monetary policy in a closed economy exible
price model. In their model, monetary policy has real e¤ects even under exible prices because rms
nancing conditions are not contingent on aggregate shocks and given nominal assets, ination has an
e¤ect on the dynamics of leverage in the economy. One of the main goals of their paper is analyzing
how much of a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal when a nancial shock hits the economy.
De Fiorre and Tristani (2011, 2012) also present a closed-economy model with sticky prices where
monetary policy has real e¤ects under exible prices. They use a costly state verication framework
and show that monetary policy a¤ects the cost of external nance even under exible prices as long
as the debt contract is in nominal terms. In such a set up, De Fiorre and Tristani (2011) focus
on dening an appropriate natural rate of interest while De Fiorre and Tristani (2012) characterize
optimal monetary policy in a simplied version of the model. Compared to these papers, the nancial
friction we use and the new monetary policy transmission mechanism we highlight is complementary,
but di¤erent. Moreover our currency union set-up help provide new results such as those related
to monetary policy trade-o¤s and optimal monetary policy response to country-specic productivity
shocks and an aggregate nancial shock.
13For recent surveys of the literature regarding optimal monetary policy in standard closed economy models, see
Woodford (2010) and in two-country models, see Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010).
14For an inuential empirical study of valuation e¤ects in an international context, see Gourinchas and Rey (2007).
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2 Model
2.1 Households
The currency union consists of two countries indexed by j 2 fs; bg and country j is populated by
households of measure nj .15 The measure of total population is normalized to be one, and thus
ns + nb = 1. Labor markets are segmented across countries: country-j household works for rms in
country j only. Firms in country j are indexed by i 2 Ij ; where Is = [0; ns] and Ib = (ns; 1].16
The representative household in country j has expected lifetime utility given by:
E0
( 1X
t=0
t
"
U (Cj;t)  1
nj
Z
Ij
V (Nj;t(i)) di
#)
; (1)
where  is the discount factor; Cj;t is country-j households consumption of the nal good; and
Nj;t(i) is her labor supply to rm i in country j. We dene U (Cj;t) and V (Nj;t(i)) as:
U (Cj;t) =
Cj;t
1    1
1   and V (Nj;t(i)) =
Nj;t(i)
1+'
1 + '
; (2)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and ' is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of the
labor supply.17
The household maximizes expected lifetime utility (1) subject to the ow budget constraint:
PtCj;t+Q
d
t

BPj;t
+
+Qbt

BPj;t
 
= BPj;t 1 +
1
nj
Z
Ij
Wj;t(i)Nj;t(i)di+
1
nj
Z
Ij
firmsj;t (i)di+
int
t +PtTj;t;
(3)
where Pt is the price index of the nal consumption good; Wj;t(i) is the nominal wage rate that the
household receives from rm i 2 Ij ; Tj;t is lump-sum transfers net of taxes from the government in
country j; Bj;t is the quantity of one-period, nominal discount bonds purchased (issued) in period
t at the price of Qdt = 1=R
d
t (Q
b
t = 1=R
b
t) and maturing in period t + 1 which means the household
in period t deposits BPj;t > 0 at the gross deposit rate R
d
t or borrows B
P
j;t < 0 at the gross borrowing
rate Rbt (the superscript P indicates "private" deposit and borrowing); and
BP
+  max  BP ; 0 and BP    min  BP ; 0 :
Households in country j own equal shares of rms that belong to country j, and thus collect prots
firmsj;t (i)=nj from rm i in each period. Also, the representative household in country j receives
dividends intt =nj from nancial intermediaries who operate across the countries. The initial wealth
distribution is given and summarized as BPs; 1  BPb; 1.18
15We use the notation s and b to denote "saver" and "borrower" since as we mentioned before, in our approximated
model, one country is always a saver while the other is always a borrower.
16Moreover, labor markets are rm-specic within a country, as in Woodford (2003).
17Unlike Curdia and Woodford (2009), household utility from consumption U (C) and disutility from working
V (N(i)) are common between the households of the two countries.
18The same property holds in the non-stochastic steady state (i.e. BPs  0  BPb ). In principle, country s and
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The household chooses consumption, bond holding, and labor supply, taking the price level, wage
rates, the interest rates, the government transfers net of taxes, and prots as given. The rst order
conditions with respect to Cj;t and Nj;t(i), after using (2) give:
Cj;t
Nj;t(i)
' =
Wj;t(i)
Pt
; (4)
which determines household labor supply for type i. Next, the rst order conditions with respect to
Bj;t; after using (2), give the consumption Euler equations:
1 = RdtEt
"
Cj;t+1
Cj;t
   Pt
Pt+1
#
(5)
for Bj;t > 0 and
1 = RbtEt
"
Cj;t+1
Cj;t
   Pt
Pt+1
#
(6)
for Bj;t < 0.
As can be seen from (3), the models nancial imperfection stems from two sources. First, the
currency union does not trade state-contingent securities. The only nancial instrument available to
hedge income risks over the currency union is the one-period nominal bond. The presence of the non-
contingent bond helps two countries smooth their consumption over time by allowing them to borrow
from and lend to each other against future incomes, albeit not perfectly. Another important source
of nancial market imperfection apart from the absence of state-contingent securities is frictions
associated with nancial intermediation that lead to a spread between Rdt and R
b
t : We discuss this
next.
2.2 Financial intermediation
Employing the modeling strategy of Curdia and Woodford (2009 and 2010), who build on Goodfriend
and McCallum (2007), there exist nancial intermediaries through which countries trade one-period
nominal bonds (or households deposit with the nancial intermediaries and borrow from the nan-
cial intermediaries). There are an innitely many identical nancial intermediaries of measure 1 that
operate union-wide. Moreover, nancial intermediation is perfectly competitive. Financial interme-
diation is however, not e¢ cient in the sense that the borrowers pay a spread above the interest rate
received by the lenders.
Financial intermediation uses up real resources in our model, resources that are produced and
consumed in the same period in which the loans are made. In particular, loan origination of quantity
bt = Bt=Pt takes up real resources given by the function  (bt) : Here, the function  (bt) is non-
decreasing and (at least weakly) convex in bt (b  0; bb  0). This leads to an endogenous
country b can be either a saver or a borrower depending on realizations of economic shocks. However, to the extent
that the gap,
 BPs   BPb , is su¢ ciently large and/or the magnitude of shocks is su¢ ciently small, country s and b will
always be "saver" and "borrower" respectively in a neighborhood around the steady state over the business cycle.
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movement in the interest rate spread as aggregate debt evolves in the economy. In addition, we
assume that 
 
b

= 0 and b
 
b

= 0, which implies both that no real resources are lost in steady
state and that variation in resource loss are at most second order.19
We also allow for exogenous variation in the interest rate spread following Curdia and Woodford
(2009 and 2010). We model this by assuming that in order to originate a quantity of loans bt that
will be repaid in the following period, it is necessary for an intermediary to also make a quantity
tbt of loans that will not be repaid. Here, the loss rate t is an exogenously varying nonnegative
quantity, which constitutes an aggregate purely nancial shock in our model. For simplicity, we treat
these opportunities for fraud as being distributed equally across all households, who take advantage
of such opportunities to the extent that they come up. Moreover, these earnings from fraud are
treated as lump-sum income by those households and in addition, are independent of the quantity
of repayable loans that the same household may take out. Financial intermediaries are unable to
distinguish the borrowers who will default from those who will repay, and so must o¤er loans to both
on the same terms. At the same time however, they are able to accurately predict the fraction of
loans that will not be repaid as a function of a given scale of their lending activity.
Financial intermediaries collect the largest amount of deposits that can be repaid from the pro-
ceeds of loans that they originate. Then, for aggregate deposits Dt and aggregate borrowing Bt, the
condition Dt = Bt or
dt = bt; (7)
holds where dt = Dt=Pt and bt = Bt=Pt. Note that (7) also serves as the clearing condition for
borrowing and lending across countries.
To see how the credit spread, !t  Q
d
t
Qbt
=
Rbt
Rdt
, is determined in equilibrium, we consider the
nancial intermediariesproblem. Given perfect competition, the intermediaries takes Qdt and Q
b
t as
given and choose bt to maximize their prots,
~intt
Pt
:
~intt
Pt
= Qdt dt  Qbtbt  Qbttbt    (bt) =

Qdt  Qbt

bt  Qbttbt    (bt) :
Since  (bt) is (weakly) convex, the rst-order condition then gives that the equilibrium credit spread
is implicitly determined as a function of a quantity of borrowing bt as:
Qdt = (1 + t)Q
b
t + b (bt) :
This equation has the usual interpretation: competitive, prot maximizing nancial intermediaries
continue to originate loans until marginal revenue from increased origination is equal to marginal
cost. The actual distribution to households intt in the budget constraint (3) includes their earnings
from fraud and thus:
intt
Pt
=
~intt
Pt
+Qbttbt =

Qdt  Qbt

bt    (bt) :
Note that the net credit spread (1 !t) is not zero in general in the small neighborhood of the steady
19For any variable Zt, we let Z be the steady state level.
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state (in the presence of shocks) though, as we emphasize later, we assume that it is zero in the
steady state ( = 0 and Qd = Qb).
2.3 Firms
The nal consumption good Yt is a CES aggregate of two intermediate goods, Ys;t and Yb;t, produced
in each country Yt =
P
j n
1

j Y
 1

j;t
 
 1
; where  is the elasticity of substitution between the two
goods. The nal consumption good is used as a numeraire and Ys;t and Yb;t have measure ns and
nb respectively. The appropriate price index is found as the minimum value that should be paid for
one unit of the consumption good and is given by Pt =
P
j njP
1 
j;t
 1
1 
: Given the demand for
the nal consumption good Yt and the price levels Pj;t for j 2 fs; bg and Pt, the optimal demand
for the intermediate goods Yj;t is the one that minimizes total expenditure, which is obtained as:
Yj;t = nj

Pj;t
Pt
 
Yt:
An intermediate good Yj;t produced by country j is in turn a CES aggregate of a continuum
of individual goods fYj;t(i)gi2Ij that are produced by the rms in country j. We have that Yj;t =
1
nj
 1
 R
Ij Yj;t(i)
 1
 di
 
 1
; with the corresponding price index Pj;t =
h
1
nj
R
Ij Pj;t(i)
1 di
i 1
1 
: The
optimal demand for Yj;t(i) is given by Yj;t(i) = 1nj

Pj;t(i)
Pj;t
 
Yj;t , 8i 2 Ij : Combining the expres-
sions for Yj;t and Yj;t(i), we obtain a consolidated demand function that each individual rm i of
country j faces:
Yj;t(i) =

Pj;t(i)
Pj;t
  Pj;t
Pt
 
Yt; 8i 2 Ij : (8)
Firm i in each country is a monopolistically competitive producer and produces a di¤erentiated
good Yj;t(i) using a constant returns to scale technology:
Yj;t(i) = AtAj;tNj;t(i); (9)
for i 2 Ij and j = fs; bg, where At and Aj;t are union-wide and country-specic productivity shocks
respectively
We model nominal rigidity following Calvo (1983). Firms in the union adjust their prices with
probability 1    each period. A rm that re-optimizes at time t chooses P j;t(i) to maximize its
expected discounted prot:
max
P j;t(i)
Et
1X
k=0
kQj;t;t+k
firms
j;t+k
 
P j;t(i);Pj;t+k; Pt+k;Wj;t+k(i); Yt+k; At+k; Aj;t+k

;
where
Qj;t;t+k = 
k

Cj;t+k
Cj;t
   Pt
Pt+k

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and
firmsj;t+k
 
P j;t(i);Pj;t+k; Pt+k;Wj;t+k(i); Yt+k; At+k; Aj;t+k

= (1  )P j;t(i)Yj;t+k(i) Wj;t+k(i)

Yj;t+k(i)
At+kAj;t+k

= (1  )P j;t(i)

P j;t(i)
Pj;t+k
  
Pj;t+k
Pt+k
 
Yt+k   Wj;t+k(i)
At+kAj;t+k

P j;t(i)
Pj;t+k
  
Pj;t+k
Pt+k
 
Yt+k:
Note that the nominal marginal cost for rm i is Wj;t(i)=AtAj;t. Since rms have a positive markup

 1

, their output would be lower than the e¢ cient level. In this paper, we abstract from this
ine¢ ciency originating from imperfect competition in steady-state, by letting  , a proportional tax
on sales of goods, to satisfy the condition (1 )


 1

= 1. The rst-order condition that determines
price setting is then given by:
Et
1X
k=0
kQj;t;t+k

P j;t(i)
Pj;t+k
  
Pj;t+k
Pt+k
 
Yt+k

P j;t(i)
Pt+k
  Wj;t+k(i)
Pt+kAj;t+kAt+k

= 0: (10)
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium where rms that re-optimize at the same time within a country
choose a common price in equilibrium: P j;t(i) = P

j;t. Thus, the price level in country j evolves
according to:
Pj;t =
h
(1  )P j;t1  + P 1 j;t 1
i 1
1 
: (11)
(10) and (11), together with the price index Pt =
P
j njP
1 
j;t
 1
1 
, determine the dynamics of the
price level for the union.
2.4 Government
The government budget constraint is:
PtGj;t +Q
d
t

BGj;t
+
+Qbt

BGj;t
 
= BGj;t 1   PtTj;t + 
1
nj
Z
Ij
Pj;t(i)Yj;t(i)di+ PtTRj ; (12)
where BGj;t denotes the net asset position of the government in country j. Note that government
debt is then given by  BGj;t. There are two potential sources of changes in government revenue in
our model: variations in lump-sum transfers Tj;t and variations in sales tax revenues. In addition,
the government receives (or gives) non-state-contingent and non-time-varying international transfers
from (to) other countries TRj (with
P
j njTRj = 0). While the presence of the international transfer
is not critical to the results, it simplies our analysis by allowing a symmetric steady state value of
consumption across countries, as we will discuss in detail later.
We will assume that initial distribution of wealth across the governments,
n
BGs; 1; BGb; 1
o
, satises
the following property: if BPs; 1  BPb; 1, then BGs; 1  BGb; 1. This simplifying assumption makes
the model tractable: if the representative household in a given country is initially in debt, so is its
13
government (and hence the county as a whole). We also assume that government spending Gj;t is 0
throughout the paper.
2.5 Market clearing
The nancial market clearing condition is given by (7), where dt = Dt=Pt and bt = Bt=Pt and
Dt = max

nsB
P
s;t + nsB
G
s;t; nbB
P
b;t + nbB
G
b;t; nsB
P
s;t + nbB
G
b;t; nbB
P
b;t + nsB
G
s;t
	
;
Bt =  min

nsB
P
s;t + nsB
G
s;t; nbB
P
b;t + nbB
G
b;t; nsB
P
s;t + nbB
G
b;t; nbB
P
b;t + nsB
G
s;t
	
:
Note that Dt; Bt  0.
The goods market clearing condition is obtained by aggregating the household and government
budget constraints, (3) and (12):
nsCs;t + nbCb;t +  (bt) = Yt; (13)
which is also the union-wide resource constraint.
2.6 Equilibrium
We now characterize the private-sector equilibrium of our model. Before analyzing equilibrium in the
decentralized economy with nominal and nancial frictions, we rst establish a useful benchmark:
the e¢ cient (rst-best) allocation. It is useful to establish the e¢ cient outcome for two main reasons:
rst, we will be approximating our model around an e¢ cient steady-state and second, we will show
that the quadratic, welfare-theoretic loss function of the union-wide central bank can be written as
a deviation of equilibrium from the e¢ cient allocation.
2.6.1 E¢ cient allocation
As usual, the unions e¢ cient allocation can be described as the solution to a social planners problem:
max
8<:X
j
nj$j
"
Cj;t
1    1
1    
1
nj

1
AtAj;t
1+' Z
Ij
Yj;t(i)
1+'
1 + '
di
#9=;
subject to the technological and resource constraints:
nsCs;t + nbCb;t =
8>><>>:
X
j
n
1

j
0@" 1
nj
 1

Z
Ij
Yj;t(i)
 1
 di
# 
 1
1A
 1

9>>=>>;

 1
:
Note that the objective function already embeds the production technology of intermediate good
producing rms and f$jg denotes Pareto weights.
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First order conditions with respect to Cj;t and Yj;t(i) are:
$jC
 
j;t = z and
$j

1
AtAj;t
1+'
Yj;t(i)
' = zY
1

t n
1

j
0@" 1
nj
 1

Z
Ij
Yj;t(i)
 1
 di
# 
 1
1A 
1


"
1
nj
 1

Z
Ij
Yj;t(i)
 1
 di
# 1
 1 
1
nj
 1

Yj;t(i)
 1
 ;
respectively, where z is a Lagrange multiplier. Note that the second equation implies that Yj;t(i)
should have a common value. Furthermore, it is easy to show that Yj;t(i) = n 1j Yj;t. Simplifying the
rst order conditions yields the e¢ cient allocations in consumption and production across countries:
CR;Et =
CEs;t
CEb;t
=

$s
$b

and Y R;Et =
Y Es;t
Y Eb;t
=

ns
nb

$s
$b
  
1+'

As;t
Ab;t
 (1+')
1+'
:20
We can see that the rst best allocations depend on how a social planner values each household
and thus, they are not unique. In other words, there is a continuum of e¢ cient allocations, each
of which is a function of Pareto weights ($s; $b), which are arbitrary. An important case arises
when a social planner is a utilitarian ($s = $b). The e¢ cient level of aggregate output is then
obtained as: Y Et =
P
j njA
( 1)(1+')
1+'
j;t A
( 1)(1+')
1+'
t
 1+'
( 1)(+')
: While it is not necessary for our results,
we will focus on this case for simplicity. In particular, the market outcome (with no frictions) and the
steady-state equilibrium (with and without frictions) will coincide with the solution to a utilitarian
social planners problem. Moreover, we will later assume a utilitarian central bank that maximizes
the representative households utility with equal weight across countries.
2.6.2 Approximate equilibrium
We solve the model by log-linearizing the private-sector equilibrium conditions around a determinis-
tic, symmetric, e¢ cient, and zero-ination steady state.21 In particular, in the steady-state, we allow
for a proportional sales tax to remove the monopolistic distortion and a lump-sum transfer to ensure
that steady-state consumption is the same across countries, even though the countries start with
di¤erent net asset positions. Moreover, in the rst-order approximation of our model, one country is
always a borrower while the other is a saver. This is so because in steady state, one country will have
positive wealth while the other will have negative. For small enough shocks then, in a rst-order
approximation, the nancial position of the countries will uctuate around these steady state values
without changing whether the country is a borrower or a saver.
We provide a detailed derivation of the steady state equilibrium as well as the full system of log-
20For any variable Zt, we let ZEt be the level when the allocation is e¢ cient. Moreover, throughout the paper, it is
convenient to use ZRt (R stands for Relative) that denotes Z
R
t  Zs;tZb;t ; which represents the ratio of a given variable
between two countries.
21These private-sector equilibrium conditions hold for any monetary policy. Given a description of monetary policy,
these conditions then fully characterize the model dynamics.
15
linear equations in the appendix.22 Here we present a simplied system that contains the equations
required to characterize optimal monetary policy:
t = Ett+1 + 

Y^t   Y^ Et

; (14)

P^Rt   P^R;Et

= 

P^Rt 1   P^R;Et 1

+ Et
h
P^Rt+1   P^R;Et+1
i
+ CC^
R
t + t; (15)
Y^t   Y^ Et

= Et

Y^t+1   Y^ Et+1

  1

n
R^dt   Ett+1   rEt
o
; (16)
C^Rt = EtC^
R
t+1 +
1

!^t; (17)
b^t = 
 1b^t 1 + BR^dt    1B^t    1nsnb (   1)

P^Rt   P^R;Et

   1nsnbC^Rt
+ (1  nb)B!^t    1nsnb (   1) P^R;Et ; and (18)
!^t  R^bt   R^dt = ^t + B b^t; (19)
where   (1 )(1 ) +'1+' ;   11++ 1+'
+'
 ; C   +' ; B  bY ; B =  1 bb; t is a
linear combination of exogenous shocks t  

EtP^
R;E
t+1   (1 + ) P^R;Et + P^R;Et 1

; and the e¢ cient
level of output, relative prices, and the real interest rate are given by Y^ Et =
1+'
+'

nsA^s;t + nbA^b;t + A^t

;
P^R;Et =   1+'1+'

A^s;t   A^b;t

; and rEt =
h


EtY^
E
t+1   Y^ Et

  nb!^t
i
respectively.23 Note that unlike
standard sticky-price models without nancial frictions, the e¢ cient rate of real interest rEt in our
model is generally endogenous as it depends on the interest rate spread !^t: All the exogenous shocks
in the model are assumed to follow AR(1) processes.
(14) is the aggregate Phillips curve that is obtained by summing up the two country-specic
Phillips curves. It shows how aggregate ination t depends critically on the aggregate output gap
Y^t   Y^ Et and expectations of future aggregate ination. (15) is obtained by subtracting the Phillips
curve of country b from that of country s. It shows how the relative price gap P^Rt   P^R;Et (i.e. the
deviation of relative prices from its e¢ cient level) depends on relative consumption C^Rt and past and
expected future values of the price gap. Just like an increase in output gap leads to an increase in
ination in the Phillips curve given by (14), (15) shows that an increase in relative consumption leads
to an increase in relative price gap. The intuition is also analogous. In a traditional Phillips curve
like (14), an increase in the output gap captures an increase in the economys average marginal cost,
22For t, we dene their deviation from a steady state as ^t = log (1 + t)   log (1 + ) = log (1 + t) : For those
variables that are lending or borrowing (bPj;t, bj;t, dt, bt), we dene their deviation from a steady state relative to the
steady state level of output. For example, b^t = bt 
b
Y
: For a variable Zt other than these variables, we let Z^t denote
percentage deviation of Zt from its steady state: Z^t  logZt   log Z: Accordingly, in the log-linear approximation,
Z^Rt  log Zs;tZb;t   log
Zs
Zb
= Z^s;t  Z^b;t: For example, CRt represents the consumption ratio between two countries and PRt
stands for the relative price between two countries: it is the terms of trade for country s and the inverse of the terms
of trade for country b.
23The e¢ cient rate of real interest rEt is the one that would prevail if output was at its e¢ cient level. Similarly P
R;E
t
is the relative price that would prevail if relative output was at its e¢ cient level.
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which leads to an increase in the price level. In (15), an increase in relative consumption reects
an increase in relative marginal cost (through income e¤ects), which in turn leads to an increase in
relative price.
These two equations constitute the supply bloc and clearly highlight the trade-o¤s that the central
bank faces in our model. First, note that from (14) it is clear that the central bank does not face a
trade-o¤ in stabilizing aggregate ination versus the aggregate output gap as there are no random
disturbance terms or other endogenous terms in the equation. This is because of the absence of
mark-up shocks and heterogeneity in price stickiness across countries. Second, note from (15) that
the central bank faces a novel trade-o¤ in stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price
gap as simultaneous stabilization of P^Rt   P^R;Et and C^Rt is not feasible with idiosyncratic technology
shocks, which lead to a movement in t. We will show that this new policy trade-o¤has an important
implication for optimal monetary policy.
(16) is the aggregate Euler equation that is obtained by summing up the two country-specic
household Euler equations. It shows how the aggregate output gap depends critically on the real
interest rate gap R^dt  Ett+1 rEt (i.e. the deviation of the ex-ante real interest rate from its e¢ cient
level) and expectations of future output gap. (17) is obtained by subtracting the two country-specic
household Euler equations and shows how relative consumption depends on the interest rate spread
and expectations of future relative consumption.
These two equations constitute the demand bloc and clearly highlight the role of nancial frictions,
in particular of the interest rate spread, in driving aggregate dynamics of the model. First, note
from (16) that a positive movement in !^t decreases the e¢ cient level of the real interest rate, which
increases the real interest rate gap, and thereby, decreases the output gap. Second, note from (17)
that a positive movement in !^t leads to an increase in relative consumption, as the increase in interest
rate spread hurts the borrower country by increasing the cost of borrowing.
Finally, (18) and (19) close the private-sector equilibrium part of the model by specifying how
the interest rate spread is determined in equilibrium. (19) shows that the interest rate spread can
move both for a purely exogenous (due to ^t which constitutes a nancial shock in our model) and
an endogenous (due to its dependence on aggregate debt b^t in the economy) reason. (18) tracks the
evolution of aggregate debt and is obtained by integrating the two country-specic household and
government budget constraints and imposing bond market clearing. Since in our model country b
is always a borrower over the business cycle, aggregate debt is proportional to the sum of private
and public (net) debt in country b. (18) shows that variations in economic variables have expected
e¤ects on the evolution of debt. First, unless net asset positions are symmetric ex-ante and in
steady-state (B = 0) and hence no country is in debt initially, an increase in the interest rate R^dt
and/or the spread !^t has a rst-order e¤ect on debt dynamics as the borrower country has to make
a higher interest payment.24 In addition, ination lowers the real value of debt as the debt is in
nominal terms. Second, an increase in the relative price implies a decrease in relative production
(i.e. country b produces more relative to country s), which in turn decreases the amount of debt.
24Note that the term nbB!^t captures dividends from nancial intermediaries, which decreases the amount of debt.
However, the net e¤ect of !^t on debt is still positive as indicated by the coe¢ cient (1  nb)B :
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Finally, a decrease in relative consumption (i.e. country b consumes more relative to country s) leads
to an increase in debt as the borrower country, ceteris paribus, would have to borrow more to nance
its consumption.
3 Monetary policy transmission mechanisms
Before moving on to analyzing optimal monetary policy, we rst discuss the various channels through
which monetary policy a¤ects real variables in our model. There are two channels of monetary policy
transmission mechanism in our set-up: a wealth redistribution channel and an aggregate demand
channel. The rst arises due to nancial imperfections, in particular due to market incompleteness
coupled with the asymmetry in ex-ante wealth positions across the two countries. The second arises
due to the usual and well-understood nominal rigidities friction. Since the wealth redistribution
channel is new to our paper, we discuss that rst. In particular, since it is independent of sticky
prices, we discuss it in a special case of our model where prices are completely exible.
3.1 Financial imperfections and the wealth redistribution channel
Consider the exible-price equilibrium of our model which can be found by taking the limit !1 in
(14)-(19).25 This will change only the rst two of the equilibrium conditions while the rest, (16)-(19),
are unchanged. First, (15) simplies to:
P^R;Ft   P^R;Et =


1 + '

C^R;Ft ; (20)
which indicates that, in contrast to the general case considered above, there would be no trade-o¤
in stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price gap in the exible-price limit. Second,
it can be seen from (14) that Y^ Ft = Y^
E
t . Thus, as in standard New Keynesian models, monetary
policy does not a¤ect aggregate output under exible prices. Moreover, there is no ine¢ ciency at
the aggregate level, which reects our assumption that resource cost of nancial intermediation is
second-order.
While monetary policy is neutral for aggregate output under exible price, it nevertheless still
has real e¤ects since it can a¤ect cross-country variables through wealth redistribution as can be
see in (18). In particular, since B 6= 0 given the ex-ante heterogeneity in wealth positions across
countries, a change in the nominal interest rate and/or ination will redistribute wealth from one
country to another as the asset traded across countries is a nominal bond. This will then a¤ect
the dynamics of b^Ft and thereby, C^
R;F
t and P^
R;F
t . For example, the central banks lowering of the
deposit interest rate (or increasing of ination) will redistribute wealth from the saver country to
the borrower country and decrease b^Ft ; which in turn decreases C^
R;F
t and P^
R;F
t . Note that for this
channel to be at work, while B 6= 0 is necessary, B 6= 0 is not. The critical requirement for wealth
redistribution is therefore incomplete markets along with initial heterogeneity in wealth. In the case
25For any variable Zt, we let Z^Ft be the rst-order approximation of Zt under exible prices.
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where !^Ft is endogenous due to B 6= 0, however, the e¤ects on C^R;Ft and P^R;Ft of changes in the
deposit rate get magnied. This is because a decrease in b^Ft leads to a decrease in the spread !^
F
t ,
which means that the cost of borrowing decreases by more now compared to the case where B = 0.
3.2 Nominal frictions and the aggregate demand channel
Next, consider the second transmission mechanism of monetary policy in our model, which arises due
to nominal rigidities. Under sticky prices, as is standard, monetary policy a¤ects aggregate variables,
in particular aggregate output, in our model. To separate out this aggregate transmission mechanism
from the wealth redistribution channel considered above under exible prices, consider a special case
of sticky prices but no initial heterogeneity in wealth (B = 0). This e¤ectively eliminates the
redistributive role of monetary policy that arises due to nancial imperfections, even though asset
markets are still incomplete and there exists an interest rate spread. In this case, from (14)-(19), we
see that the following system determines
n
C^Rt ; P^
R
t ; bt
o
as a function of ^t and P^
R;E
t only:
P^Rt = P^
R
t 1 + Et
h
P^Rt+1
i
+ CC^
R
t + (1   (1 + )) P^R;Et ;
C^Rt = Et[C^
R
t+1] +
1


^t + B b^t

; and
b^t = 
 1b^t 1    1nsnb (   1) P^Rt    1nsnbC^Rt :
The cross-country distributions of quantities and prices
n
C^Rt ; P^
R
t ; bt
o
are completely independent
of aggregate variables and therefore, of monetary policy. Nevertheless monetary policy still a¤ects
aggregate output. This transmission mechanism is captured by (16) which shows how by a¤ecting
the ex-ante real interest rate R^dt   Ett+1, the central bank can a¤ect the aggregate output gap.
Under sticky prices (and unlike the case above with exible prices), monetary policy can a¤ect
R^dt   Ett+1 because Ett+1 is endogenously determined in the model as shown by (14).
3.3 Interactions of the two channels
In general, with both nominal and nancial imperfections, these two transmission mechanisms in-
teract and there are non-trivial interactions between aggregate dynamics, monetary policy, and
cross-country distribution of prices and quantities in our model. In particular, the two mechanisms
reinforce each other in a way such that monetary policy has a bigger and more persistent e¤ect
on aggregate output and cross-country variables. For example, consider an expansionary monetary
policy shock. With respect to the e¤ect on aggregate output, the wealth redistribution channel re-
inforces the aggregate demand channel by decreasing the amount of debt. A decrease in debt lowers
the interest rate spread, which in turn plays a role of a positive aggregate demand shock and thereby
increases aggregate output even further. Moreover, since the dynamics of debt is persistent, even
if a monetary policy shock is purely transitory, it can a¤ect aggregate output in a persistent man-
ner. Finally, the interaction also implies that the dynamics of relative prices and consumption also
become more persistent. This is primarily because the two frictions independently introduce addi-
19
tional state variables in the model, thereby generating endogenous persistence. In particular, sticky
prices introduce relative prices, while nancial imperfections introduce debt as an endogenous state
variable.26 Under sticky prices, ination is also naturally persistent, which further imparts complex
dynamics. As a simple illustration of these interaction e¤ects, we show the impulse responses to an
expansionary monetary policy shock in the appendix in Figure 10. In particular, to highlight how
such interactions increase aggregate persistence, we posit a simple Taylor rule with no interest rate
smoothing term and with i.i.d. shocks.27
In addition, this interaction of the two transmission mechanisms gives rise to a novel trade-o¤
in our model for the central bank in stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price gap,
as given by (15). Without both these mechanisms at work this policy trade-o¤ would not exist: if
we shut down the wealth redistribution channel by setting B = 0, then relative consumption and
the relative price gap would evolve independently of monetary policy, thereby precluding any role
of policy; while if we shut down the aggregate demand channel by assuming no nominal rigidities
( = 1), then since P^R;Ft   P^R;Et =


1+'

C^R;Ft , the central bank would not face a trade-o¤
between stabilizing C^R;Ft versus P^
R;F
t   P^R;Et :
The fact that the interaction of two channels allows the central bank to inuence forcefully both
aggregate dynamics and the cross-country distribution and that a new policy trade-o¤ arises as a
result leads to a very non-trivial optimal monetary policy problem in our general model. We explore
this in detail next.
4 Optimal monetary policy
We now analyze optimal monetary policy in our model, focussing in particular on the role played
by the interaction of imbalances in net asset positions across countries with various nancial im-
perfections introduced in our model such as imperfect risk-sharing due to incomplete markets and
endogenous and exogenous variations in the interest rate spread. We use a linear-quadratic approach,
following Woodford (2003), and derive a quadratic welfare-theoretic loss-function of the central bank
by taking a second-order approximation of an equally-weighted sum of the two households utilities
around the e¢ cient non-stochastic steady-state that we discussed above. A rst-order approximation
of the private sector equilibrium conditions then represent the constraints faced by the central bank.
We study this Ramsey problem of minimizing the loss function subject to the constraints under
commitment, where the monetary policy instrument is the deposit rate R^dt .
4.1 Welfare-theoretic loss function
The welfare-theoretic loss function of the union-wide central bank is established in the following
proposition:
26Due to nominal rigidities, relative price depends on its lagged value, as can be seen by comparing (15) to (20).
27The calibration of the model, as well as more analysis with a Taylor rule, is presented in detail later in the paper.
Here the Figure is presented for illustrative purposes only.
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Proposition 1 The discounted sum of the utilities of households is given by:
1X
t=0
t
X
j=s;b
nj
(
U(Cj;t)  1
nj
Z
Ij
V (Nj;t(i)) di
)
=  UC
Y
2
1X
t=0
tLt + t:i:p:+O
 kk3 ;
where
Lt = s
2
s;t + b
2
b;t + Y

Y^t   Y^ Et
2
+ P

P^Rt   P^R;Et
2
+ C

C^Rt
2
+ B b^
2
t ; (21)
s = ns
 ( + ')

; b = nb
 ( + ')

; Y =  + '; P = nsnb (1 + ') ; C = nsnb; B = bb;
t:i:p stands for the terms independent of monetary policy, and O
 kk3 denotes all relevant terms
that are of third or higher order.
Proof. In appendix.
The terms in the loss function clearly indicate the various distortions and ine¢ ciencies that are
present in our model. As is well-known, since sticky-prices cause ine¢ cient dispersion in prices and
in production of goods at the micro-level, ination of the two countries, s;t and b;t; appear in
the loss function. Moreover, sticky prices cause ine¢ ciency at the aggregate-level as well and hence
the output gap Y^t   Y^ Et , the gap between output and its e¢ cient level, is also present in the loss
function. These terms are standard when compared to the literature on closed-economy models,
such as the one explained in detail in Woodford (2003). In addition, in a currency union, since the
countries face e¤ectively a xed exchange rate, sticky prices also cause a cross-country distortion,
and hence the relative price gap P^Rt   P^R;Et is present in the loss function.28 This was shown rst
in Benigno (2004). The remaining two terms appearing in the loss function are related to nancial
imperfections in our model. First, since we allow for trade in only non-state contingent bond, there
is imperfect risk-sharing across countries. Therefore, the relative consumption term C^Rt captures
this ine¢ ciency at the cross-country level. Closed economy or two-country models with incomplete
markets in the literature, such as Curdia and Woodford (2009), Benigno (2009), and De Fiorre and
Tristani (2012), also feature a similar term in their welfare-theoretic loss functions. Finally, since
nancial intermediation consumes real resources in our model and the interest rate spread depends
endogenously on aggregate debt, there is also aggregate debt b^t in the loss-function, which captures
the aggregate ine¢ ciency caused by nancial frictions.29
Because the loss function we derived above is micro-founded, the weights on the various terms
are economically meaningful and are functions of the structural parameters. As is standard, the
28 In a two-country model with exible exchange rates and staggered sticky prices, where rms set prices in their
countrys currency (producer currency pricing), such a distortion is not as relative prices adjust due to exchange rate
adjustment, as shown by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). Even in a two-country model with exible exchange rates,
when rms set prices in the importing countrys currency (local currency pricing) however, a similar distortion is present
as relative prices do not adjust optimally to shocks, as shown in an important recent paper by Engel (2011).
29Note that we have a quadratic term in aggregate debt in the loss function, which is di¤erent from Curdia and
Woodford (2009). While our set-up is very similar to Curdia and Woodford (2009), which term representing debt ap-
pears in the loss-function is di¤erent. This is because we make slightly di¤erent assumptions on steady-state elasticities
related to the nancial intermediation process.
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weights on the two ination terms, s and b; depends critically on the extent of price-stickiness
(or the slope of the Phillips curves) as captured by  = (1 )(1 )
+'
1+' : Moreover, they depend on
the elasticity of substitution across varieties , because this determines how relative price dispersion
across varieties due to ination translates into relative production dispersion across varieties. Note
that  also appears while interacted with the elasticity of labor supply ' as i = ns
(1+')
(1 )(1 ) for
i = s; b. This is because households dislike the labor misallocation across varieties more when the
disutility of supplying labor has a bigger curvature (a larger '). The interaction term ' therefore,
disappears when household has a linear disutility (' = 0). Moreover, even if ' 6= 0, the interaction
term ' would also be dropped from  (1 + ') if labor markets were not rm-specic in each country:
that is, each member country has a common country-wide labor market. Next, the weight on output
gap depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption  and the elasticity of
labor supply '; as these preference parameters determine how households value consumption and
leisure.
For the relative price gap, the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution appears in the weight
because it determines the extent of distortion in relative output and thereby, in relative labor for
a given uctuation in relative prices. Moreover, we can again see that there is an interaction term
' in P . This is because households dislike this labor misallocation across countries more when
the disutility of supplying labor has a bigger curvature (a larger '). The interaction term therefore,
disappears when household has a linear disutility (' = 0), in which case, P is simply given by nsnb.
This result implies that the elasticity of labor supply may have an important policy implication
especially when there is a trade-o¤ between relative price stabilization and other policy objectives
(such as relative consumption stabilization in our model). Again, even if ' 6= 0, the interaction term
' would also be dropped from  (1 + ') if labor markets were not segmented across countries:
that is, the economy has a common union-wide labor market. Next, the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion  matters critically for the weight on relative consumption since it governs the extent of
consumption-smoothing preferences of households. Finally, as is natural, the weight on aggregate
debt depends on the steady-state elasticity of the spread with respect to debt.
We next establish a result regarding comparative statics of the weights that we discussed above
with respect to various important structural parameters.
Proposition 2 Ination stabilization becomes more important relative to the other policy objectives
as the degree of price stickiness and/or the elasticity of substitution increase:
@

j
i

@j
> 0 and
@

j
i

@ > 0 for j = s; b and i = Y; P;C; and B: Moreover, relative price stabilization becomes relatively
more important as the elasticity of substitution between country s and country b goods increases:
@

P
i

@ > 0 for i = s; b; Y; C; and B: Finally, relative consumption stabilization becomes relatively
more important as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion increases:
@

C
i

@ > 0 for i = s; b; Y; P; and
B:
Proof. In appendix.
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The comparative static results above are all intuitive. The weights on ination increase when
the extent of price stickiness increases as well as when the elasticity of substitution across varieties
increases as both lead to a greater dispersion of production across varieties. Next,
@

P
i

@ > 0 because,
when  is larger, the relative price distortion leads to a bigger distortion in relative output, which
in turn a¤ects negatively householdswelfare as it allocates labor hours ine¢ ciently across countries
(i.e. not justied by variations in As and Ab). Finally,
@

C
i

@ > 0 as it implies a greater preference
for consumption-smoothing by households.
We conclude this subsection with a nal observation that the loss function (21) can also be written
as
Lt = 
2
t + Y

Y^t   Y^ Et
2
+ nsnb

P^Rt
2
+ P

P^Rt   P^R;Et
2
+ C

C^Rt
2
+ B b^
2
t ; (22)
where  =
(+')
 . This alternative representation will be useful for our analysis below as it naturally
partitions the terms in the loss function into the two aggregate (and conventional) target variablesn
t; Y^t
o
and the three distributional target variables
n
P^Rt ; C^
R
t ; b^t
o
.
4.2 Optimal policy under commitment
In general, we characterize the dynamics of the model under optimal policy numerically, using the
method of Sims (2000). In this case, we use the general loss function (21) (or (22)) and characterize
the Ramsey problem of the central bank as choosing the target variables in the loss function and the
policy instrument R^dt to minimize
1
2E0
P1
t=0 
tLt, subject to (14)-(19). The optimality conditions of
this problem are contained in the appendix. We later also compare model responses under optimal
policy to those under two simple interest rate rules: a standard Taylor rule and a spread-adjusted
Taylor rule. For the standard Taylor rule, we use the specication R^dt = t + yyt; while for the
spread-adjusted Taylor rule, we use the specication R^dt = t + yyt   !!^t:
Before presenting the results of the general model, we rst analyze the two special cases that we
discussed above to illustrate in isolation the role of each channel. For these two cases, analytical
results are available and the fact that monetary policy is neutral for cross-country variables in one
special case (with the aggregate demand channel only) while it is neutral for aggregate output in
the other special case (with the wealth redistribution channel only) allows us to clearly show the
implications of the two types of frictions for optimal monetary policy. These also serve as useful
reference points for the more general environment where the two mechanisms interact.
4.2.1 Special cases
Nominal frictions and the aggregate demand channel We rst consider a special case of our
model where only the aggregate demand transmission mechanism is in operation because the relevant
friction for policy is sticky prices. In particular, we neutralize the e¤ect of nancial imperfections
by setting B = 0 so that countries are ex-ante symmetric in net asset positions and imposing
B = 0 so that the interest rate spread is purely exogenous. As discussed above, the latter condition
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(B = 0) is not required to shut down the wealth redistribution channel and thus not necessary for
our analytical result below. It nevertheless makes this particular version of our model similar to
the standard framework often considered in the open economy literature, for example in Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (1996) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), where countries frictionlessly trade in a non-
state contingent bond and there is no initial heterogeneity in net foreign asset positions. It thereby
allows us to make a straightforward comparison to the literature.30 This will also provide a useful
benchmark as later, we can clearly see implications of redistributive role of monetary policy and
endogenous variations in interest rate spread and nancial shocks. In what follows we refer to this
case as NoFF(for No Financial Frictions).31 We summarize our results in the proposition below.
Proposition 3 Under NoFF,the cross-country distributions of quantities and prices
n
C^Rt ; P^
R
t ; b^t
o
are determined independently from monetary policy, and (22) simplies to:
Lt = 
2
t + Y

Y^t   Y^ Et
2
:
Moreover, the optimal policy is to set t = 0 and thereby, Y^t   Y^ Et = 0; for all t. Optimal policy
however, does not achieve the e¢ cient outcome.
Proof. In appendix.
With only nominal frictions, as we showed before, the cross-country variables are independent
of monetary policy.32 Thus, it is easy to see that (22) simplies to contain only the two aggregate
target variables, t and Y^t  Y^ Et . Moreover, since there is no trade-o¤ in stabilizing t vs. Y^t  Y^ Et (as
given by (14)), it is clear that optimal policy sets t = 0 and thereby, Y^t   Y^ Et = 0; for all t: In
our model, therefore, if sticky prices are the only relevant friction, then complete stabilization of
union-wide ination is optimal. This optimal policy, however, does not achieve rst-best because in
the presence of country-specic productivity shocks, all the other cross-country target variables are
not zero and are in fact outside the control of the central bank.
Financial imperfections and the wealth redistribution channel Consider the other special
case of our model where only the wealth redistribution transmission mechanism is in operation
because the relevant friction for policy is nancial imperfections combined with initial asymmetry in
wealth positions. That is, this is the case where prices are completely exible,  ! 1.33 In what
follows we refer to this case as NoNF(for No Nominal Frictions). We summarize our results in
the proposition below.
30 In addition, endogenous variations in the interest rate spread amplify the wealth redistribution e¤ect. Therefore,
making the interest spread purely exogenous in this benchmark case will enable us to see more clearly the di¤erence
the new channel generates.
31Once again, to be perfectly clear, this special case still features nancial imperfections since markets are incomplete.
As discussed however, the frictions become irrelevant for optimal monetary policy in this case, and hence the name.
32Benigno (2004) considered e¤ectively complete asset markets, in which case C^Rt = 0 and
n
Y^ Rt ; P^
R
t ; 
R
t
o
are
independent from monetary policy. Here we show that when the economy has only risk-free bonds, the same result
holds only in the limiting case, NoFF.
33As we mentioned before, in a di¤erent set-up with nancial frictions, De Fiorre, Teles, and Tristani (2011) also
analyze optimal monetary policy under exible prices.
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Proposition 4 Under NoNF,aggregate output is determined independently from monetary policy,
and (22) simplies to:
Lt = ~C

C^R;Ft
2
+ B

b^Ft
2
;
where ~C 

P


1+'
2
+ C

. Moreover, under optimal policy, the solution for the target vari-
ables is given as:
b^Ft = b^
F
t 1   #1^t and
C^R;Ft = #2b^
F
t 1 + #3^t;
where  2 (0; 1) and #j > 0 for j = 1; 2; and 3. Optimal policy however, does not achieve the
e¢ cient outcome.
Proof. In appendix.
With only nancial frictions, as we showed before, Y^ Ft = Y^
E
t :Moreover, since !1;  ! 0: In
addition, as discussed earlier and can be seen from (20), the central bank does not face a trade-o¤
between stabilizing the relative price gap and relative consumption. Thus, it is easy to see that
(22) simplies to contain only C^R;Ft and b^
F
t .
In this case, the central bank will seek to minimize the loss function subject to the sequence of
constraints given by (17), which can be rewritten as:
C^R;Ft = EtC^
R;F
t+1 +
B

b^Ft +
1

^t: (23)
The other variables, in turn, will be determined residually for a given optimal time path of C^Rt and
b^t. It is worth stressing the similarities between this problem and the one in the previous special
case of only sticky prices (or in standard New Keynesian models). First, note that (23) looks
remarkably similar to the standard Phiilips curve (14) that acts as a constraint in the optimal policy
problem under sticky prices. Just like the slope of the Phillips curve, , captures the extent of
the conventional trade-o¤ (if any) between the two target variables, ination and output gap, B
captures the degree of trade-o¤ between stabilizing relative consumption and debt. Moreover, it
is time variation in ^t, an ine¢ cient demand -type shock, that generates a trade-o¤ for the central
bank by making it impossible to attain simultaneously zero C^R;Ft and b^
F
t , thereby precluding optimal
monetary policy from reaching the e¢ cient outcome. The role of ^t is therefore reminiscent of that
of ine¢ cient supply-type shocks, such as variation in mark-up, in a prototypical optimal monetary
policy problem.34 As a result, the optimal responses of C^R;Ft and b^
F
t to a change in ^t will be similar
to those of ination and output gap to a change in mark-up in the conventional set-up. This can be
seen clearly from the resulting targeting rulewhich is given as:
~CC^
R;F
t =  B

B
h
b^Ft    1b^Ft 1
i
=  
h
b^Ft    1b^Ft 1
i
: (24)
34Note again that for simplicity, we do not consider markup shocks.
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This targeting rule has an analogous interpretation to the usual case in the sticky price model and
shows that the optimizing central bank conducts a leaning against the wind policy. Suppose a
positive nancial shock hits and drives the interest rate spread upward. This generates an ine¢ cient
wealth redistribution from the borrower to the saver country and forces the latter to consume more
relative to the former (i.e. increases C^R;Ft ). The optimizing central bank will dampen the rise in
C^R;Ft and thus mitigate the distributional ine¢ ciency by driving lower the debt of the borrower
country up to the point where condition (24) is satised.35
Our closed-form solutions for the target variables in Proposition 4 also make the same point.
Relative consumption and debt respond only to the aggregate nancial shock ^t and not to the
aggregate and idiosyncratic technology shocks. This is again because there would be no trade-o¤ in
stabilizing C^Rt vs. b^t if nancial shocks were not hitting the economy, as can be seen in (23). In
addition, under optimal policy, b^t decreases while C^Rt increases in response to the nancial shock.
Once again, this result is consistent with our discussion of the central bank conducting a leaning
against the windpolicy. In contrast to the previous special case with only nominal frictions (NoFF ),
ination on the other hand will uctuate over time responding to (all) shocks. Variation in ination,
as mentioned above, incurs no welfare costs, and thus the central bank has no incentive to stabilize
ination.36
In sum, when each of the frictions is considered in isolation, the central bank faces a single
policy trade-o¤ in our model. In the rst special case with nominal frictions only (NoFF ), we have
shown that the central bank balances the variability of t and Y^t   Y^ Et , although the absence of
ine¢ cient supply shocks makes this conventional trade-o¤ not relevant in our model. In the other
specic case (NoNF ), we have highlighted a new policy trade-o¤ (C^Rt vs. b^t) that results from
the introduction of the wealth redistribution channel as nancial imperfections become relevant for
monetary policy. While these specic cases are instructive and the policy trade-o¤s in each specic
case will continue to be important, in our general model with nancial and nominal frictions, both
the channels of monetary policy transmission will be at work, which will enable the central bank
to inuence both aggregate and distributional variables simultaneously. Moreover, the interaction
of these two frictions creates additional policy trade-o¤s. For example, as we discussed before, a
novel trade-o¤ in stabilizing C^Rt vs. P^
R
t   P^R;Et appears in the general model. In addition, there
will be a trade-o¤ in mitigating aggregate ine¢ ciency vs. distributional ine¢ ciency. For instance,
the central bank will not allow the nominal interest rate (and hence ination) to uctuate as much
to mitigate variations in relative variables if nominal frictions are present in addition to nancial
frictions. In general, there will be nontrivial interactions between aggregate dynamics (and hence
monetary policy) and cross-country distribution of prices and quantities. The central bank thus
has to optimally balance the variability of all the target variables that are present in (21). Since
analytical results are not available, we explore this general case numerically next.
35The central bank can implement this by decreasing its policy instrument, Rdt . We will illustrate this in the next
section numerically.
36 In fact, under exible prices, the ination rate overall will move in the same direction as the nominal rate due to
the well-known Fisher e¤ect.
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4.2.2 General case
We rst present the parameterization of our general model and then show impulse responses under
optimal monetary policy and under simple rules.
Parameterization Our parameterization, as given in Table 2, is mostly standard except for a
few parameters. We pick the price stickiness parameter  to be 0:55 to match the evidence from
Dhyne et al (2006) that the monthly frequency of price changes in the Euro Area is 15:1%. We pick
Bb 
bb
Y
=
bb; 1
Y
to match the average net foreign asset-to-GDP ratio of Spain.37 The parameter
B = bb= implies a change in !^t associated with a unit change in b^t while all other variables are
xed. We estimate the long-run impact of a unit increase in the net foreign asset-to-GDP ratio on
the interest rate spread using a panel of the seven countries in Table 1 and set B to be consistent
with this estimate. It is non-trivial to estimate the process for t. Instead, we x  to a large value
(0:9) in order to capture a persistent propagation of disruptions in the nancial market throughout
the economy. A similar value is often used in the literature. We also x the standard deviation of
t to the same value as our estimate of the standard deviation of the country-specic productivity
shocks. Our model implies that per-capita output is the sum of the area-wide and country-specic
productivity shocks that follow an AR(1) process. We build an empirical model for per-capita output
in the Euro Area that has the same shock structure and estimate the parameters. The details of the
estimation of B and the parameters of the productivity shock processes are in the appendix.
Table 2: Parameter values used in the numerical analysis
 0.99 ns = nb 0.5 Bb -3.43  0.9  0.01
' 1  6  1.5 A 0.73 A 0.002
 3  0.55 y 0.125 As 0.98 As 0.01
 3 B 0.11 ! 0.3, 0.5, 1 Ab 0.98 Ab 0.01
Impulse responses under optimal policy We show impulses responses of various endogenous
variables to the four shocks impinging on the economy where we also plot the response of target (or
e¢ cient) level of each variable.38 To highlight policy implications of the nancial imperfections in
our model, our general model (labeled General) is contrasted with its complete market counterpart
(labeled Complete). In addition, we also present impulse responses under NoFF.39 As mentioned
above, NoFF where we eliminate the wealth redistribution channel corresponds to the frictionless
bond economy often studied in the open economy literature and can also be considered as an
intermediate case between Complete and General. The purpose of presenting this special case is
to see how optimal monetary policy changes when the conventional aggregate demand channel is
supplemented by the wealth redistribution channel.
37Note that B =  nbBb : We chose Spains numbers because it is the median among the PIIGS countries.
38The impulse responses are for a one-standard-deviation shock.
39To avoid cluttering the gures, we present impulse responses under no nominal frictions (NoNF) only for the
nancial shock. We do so for two main reasons. First, in section 4.2.1 we showed that the target variables under NoNF
respond only to the nancial shock. Second, under NoNF, the response of ination tends to be so high that it makes
visualizing the response of ination for other model variants very di¢ cult.
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Aggregate productivity shock Figure 2 shows the response of endogenous variables to an
aggregate productivity shock. In our general model, complete stabilization of the union-wide ination
is not optimal. This is in stark contrast with the case often considered in the literature, that of
complete markets (e.g. Benigno (2004)), where complete stabilization of union-wide ination is
optimal under no heterogeneity in price stickiness across countries if the only disturbance hitting
the economy is an aggregate productivity shock. As discussed earlier, such strict ination targeting
policy can be optimal even in our model where asset markets are incomplete but only in the special
case, NoFF. The intuition for the general sub-optimality of strict ination targeting is clear from
our earlier discussion. With the two transmission mechanism channels, the central bank can now
a¤ect both aggregate and distributional dynamics. The central bank thus optimally balances the
variability of all the target variables that are present in (22), instead of closing the gapfor output
and ination only. Despite this di¤erence, our numerical results suggest that nancial imperfections
do not create a signicant di¤erence in the optimal response to a shock to aggregate productivity.
This is because this aggregate shock a¤ects member countries almost symmetrically and thus raises
fairly little distributional concern for the central bank.40 Overall, our results imply that if the main
source of disturbance in the economy is an aggregate productivity shock, then conventional strict
ination targeting policy may not be a bad approximation to fully optimal policy. Finally, Figure 2
also illustrates that while under complete markets, optimal policy (complete stabilization of ination)
leads to an e¢ cient outcome, in our general model, e¢ ciency is not obtained.
Country-specic productivity shocks Financial imperfections matter more for monetary
policy when country-specic productivity shocks hit the economy. Figures 3 and 4 show the response
of endogenous variables to a productivity shock in the saver and borrower country respectively.
While the di¤erences due to nancial imperfections are still relatively small with respect to the two
aggregate target variables, output gap and ination, they are more signicant with respect to the
two cross-country variables, relative consumption and relative prices.41 This nding may not be
surprising given our earlier discussion that country-specic productivity shocks are the main driver
that generate a new policy trade-o¤ between relative consumption stabilization and relative price
gap stabilization. Note rst that even under complete markets, as emphasized by Benigno (2004),
the optimal policy of complete stabilization of union-wide ination does not achieve the e¢ cient
outcome as the relative price gap is not zero. Most importantly, it is clear that, compared either to
the complete markets or the NoFF case, relative price deviates further away from its e¢ cient level
in our general model. In other words, the central bank allows for less exibility in relative price.
The reason for this important result is that the central bank due to the new trade-o¤ optimally
balances the variability of relative consumption and relative price gap. Consider the case in which
the productivity of country s increases, which decreases the e¢ cient level of relative price P^R;Et . The
40However, as can be seen from Figure 2, even aggregate productivity shocks have some distributional e¤ects (albeit
not signicant quantitatively) because an increase in At generates deation, which transfers wealth from country b to
country s. This in turn decreases relative consumption and price.
41For output gap and ination, note that while there are some di¤erences initially, after a couple of quarters, the
di¤erences are not quantitatively relevant.
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optimizing central bank will then try to lower relative price P^Rt to mitigate the gap between P^
R
t and
P^R;Et . With the new policy trade-o¤however, the central bank will not lower P^
R
t (or equivalently raise
Y^ Rt ) as much as illustrated in the third row of Figures 3 because otherwise relative consumption
would rise too much above its e¢ cient level (C^R;Et = 0).
42 In addition, as extensively discussed in
Section 4.2.1, the central bank counteracts to an increase in relative consumption by driving lower
the debt of the borrower country. The insight obtained under the special case, NoNF, therefore still
applies in the general environment and to other types of shocks. In contrast, we do not observe this
pattern under NoFF (and Complete) as the central bank in that environment has no control over
either debt or relative consumption due to the absence of the wealth redistribution channel.
Figures 3 and 4 also reveal that while the response of the economy to an increase in A^s;t is
quite similar to that to an increase in A^b;t (with one being almost the mirror image of the other in
the case of the country-specic variables), they are not exactly the same. Interestingly, the biggest
discrepancy is observed in the responses of the aggregate variables such as output, ination, and the
deposit interest rate. In particular, the rst panels in the gures show that while A^s;t and A^b;t a¤ect
the e¢ cient level of output Y^ Et symmetrically, the responses of aggregate output are asymmetric:
output stays above the e¢ cient level in the rst two quarters after a positive shock to country s
while it is below the e¢ cient level after a positive shock to country b. This result arises because of
the linkage between the aggregate variables and the relative variables generated by the imbalances
in net asset positions and nancial frictions between member countries. In contrast, in the absence
of such a linkage when a change in the interest rate and ination have no redistributive role 
the responses of each of the aggregate variables will coincide after country-specic shocks, and the
responses of country-specic variables and debt to a shock in one country will exactly be a mirror
image of their counterparts in case of a shock in the other country. This is precisely what we see in
Figures 3 and 4 for the complete market and NoFF case.
To understand how the redistributive channel of monetary policy generates asymmetric optimal
responses, consider rst the case in which a positive shock to A^s;t is realized. Then, consumption
in country s increases relatively more than consumption in country b. The optimizing central bank,
as discussed above, will conduct the leaning against the wind policy: it will try to reduce the
consumption gap by lowering the deposit rate and raising ination (as shown in the second and last
panels in Figure 3), thereby decreasing the value of debt, which in turn, leads the aggregate output
to respond more than its e¢ cient level. For the same reason, the central bank raises the deposit rate
and decreases ination in response to an increase in A^b;t, which in turn leads to a smaller increase
in output relative to the output gap. The only di¤erence is that the central bank in the former case
adjusts the deposit rate and ination by a smaller amount. The intuition is straightforward. An
increase in productivity at any levels (A^s;t, A^b;t; or A^t) is deationary (see also Figure 2). Thus,
it is generally more costly for the central bank to raise overall ination in response to a positive
productivity shock. More specically, after an increase in A^s;t, the central bank wishes to decrease
P^s;t (and thus s;t), given a corresponding decline in the e¢ cient level of P^Es;t (and hence P^
R;E
t ). But
42Similar mechanisms are at work while considering a positive shock to the productivity of country b, as illustrated
in the third row of Figure 4.
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at the same time, as discussed above, the central bank has an incentive to raise the overall price
level. Therefore, on balance, the central bank would decrease P^s;t (and thus s;t) less and at the
same time increase t less than it otherwise would. Therefore, the responses of ination, deposit
rate, and output are more dampened in response to a change in A^s;t than to a change in A^b;t.
Aggregate nancial shock Figure 5 shows the response of endogenous variables to a nancial
shock that causes an increase in the interest rate spread. Here we also present impulse responses
under NoNF. This nancial disturbance appears to give the most signicant challenge to the central
bank, as overall, the variables in the central banks loss function deviate from their respective target
levels by a larger degree relative to the other shocks.43
A nancial shock in general generates both aggregate and distributional ine¢ ciencies. An increase
in the spread works as a negative aggregate demand shock, exerting a contractionary pressure on
aggregate output and ination as discussed earlier and as can be seen from (16). Therefore, under
optimal policy, the central bank decreases the policy rate to mitigate the adverse e¤ects on ination
and the output gap that the increase in interest rate spread would cause otherwise. Our numerical
results indicates that optimal policy maintains ination and output close to their respective target
levels, which is not surprising given the large weight attached to ination stabilization relative to
the other policy objectives in (22).44 In addition, the central banks lowering of the deposit rate
optimally reduces the distributional ine¢ ciency caused by wealth redistribution  which is once
again an illustration of the leaning against the windpolicy discussed in Section 4.2.1. Since an
increase in the spread redistributes wealth in favor of the saver country, relative consumption tends
to increase. This in turn raises the marginal cost in the saver country relative to the borrower country
through income e¤ects, which increases the relative price. By lowering the deposit rate, which also
leads to ination, the central bank can counter such ine¢ cient wealth redistribution, and thereby
moderate ine¢ cient variations in relative consumption and prices. In contrast to the general case,
variations in relative consumption and price are more pronounced under NoFF, as then the central
bank does not (and cannot) control cross-country distributions, and thus focuses entirely on the two
aggregate target variables.
Put di¤erently, the results in our general model, perhaps not surprisingly, are a mixture of
the two polar cases studied analytically above. The optimal response of ination after a nancial
shock in our general model resembles that under NoFF (where the central bank focuses exclusively
on ination stabilization), while the general case is quite close to NoNF (where the central bank
focuses exclusively on cross-country distributions) with respect to the dynamics of the cross-country
variables, such as relative consumption, relative prices, and debt. In this sense, one can think of
coarsely approximating the optimal policy of the general model in response to the nancial shock
by combining the results on aggregate ination under NoFF (Proposition 3) and the results on
43Note here that in our calibration the standard deviation of the nancial shock is the same as that of the idiosyncrac-
tic productivity shock but the persistence is lower. Therefore, the result that variables deviate from their respective
target levels by more in the case of the nancial shock is clearly indicative of the substantial pressures that the shock
generates for the central bank.
44This will become even more apparent below when we compare optimal policy to the standard Taylor rule.
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cross-country variables under NoNF (Proposition 4).
Impulse responses under simple rules We now present our results on how model dynamics
di¤er between optimal policy and policy conducted using simple rules. In particular, we consider
two simple monetary policy rules: a standard Taylor rule (! = 0) and a spread-adjusted Taylor
rule (! = 0:3; 0:5 ; 1). Figures 6-9 show the responses of endogenous variables to an aggregate
productivity shock, a productivity shock in the borrower country, a productivity shock in the saver
country, and an aggregate nancial shock respectively. The simple rules do not, as is expected,
replicate the outcomes under optimal policy.
The main di¤erence between the two types of Taylor rules is most evident in Figure 9 when
the economy is hit by a nancial shock. The standard Taylor rule allows for a signicant negative
output gap and a negative response of ination. On the other hand, a spread-adjusted Taylor rule
mitigates this outcome. In particular, a value of ! = 0:5 comes close to replicating the response
under optimal monetary policy.45
This nding may come as no surprise given that most of the discrepancy between the optimal
policy and the standard Taylor rule is in the response of aggregate output and ination as is evident
in the rst row of Figure 9. It is well understood in the monetary policy literature that the central
bank is able to keep the economy at the e¢ cient level of production if the interest rate is maintained
at its e¢ cient counterpart. Moreover, in our model, when aggregate output is at the e¢ cient level,
ination is completely stabilized (see (14)). Since the e¢ cient interest rate more precisely, the
e¢ cient deposit rate is a decreasing function of the spread in our model, a spread-adjusted Taylor
rule comes quite close to the optimal policy with a suitably appropriate degree of spread adjustment.
In particular, recall that the e¢ cient interest rate is given as rEt = 

EtY^
E
t+1   Y^ Et

  nb!^t in our
model and nb = 0:5. It is therefore not a coincidence that a value of ! = 0:5 comes close to
replicating the response under optimal monetary policy. Interestingly, the best performing spread-
adjusted Taylor rule mimics the leaning against the windpolicy and replicates the optimal response
of not only aggregate output and ination but also other target variables such as relative price, relative
consumption, and debt.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study optimal monetary policy in a currency union model with nominal and
nancial frictions. Asymmetric ex-ante net asset positions introduce a wealth redistribution role
for monetary policy in our model. This transmission mechanism is in principle independent of
sticky prices, which lead to the usual aggregate demand channel of monetary policy transmission.
Our derivation of the welfare-theoretic loss-function of the central bank clearly shows the various
distortions in our economy: those related to sticky prices; an e¤ectively xed exchange rate regime
coupled with sticky prices; and nancial frictions that lead to imperfect cross-country risk-sharing
45 In future work, we will more rigorously determine optimal simple monetary policy rules and compare quantitatively
how they compare to optimal monetary policy.
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and an endogenous spread between the borrowing and deposit rates. Variation in the interest rate
spread a¤ects both aggregate variables, by a¤ecting total spending, and relative (cross-country)
variables, by redistributing wealth across countries. Moreover, due to the interaction of nominal
and nancial frictions, we show that in our economy, monetary policy e¤ects get amplied and the
central bank faces a novel trade-o¤ between stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price
gap (the deviation of relative prices from their e¢ cient level).
We show that due to the new terms introduced in the loss-function by nancial frictions, a strict
ination targeting policy that sets union-wide ination to zero is not optimal even when an aggregate
productivity shock hits the economy. Moreover, the new trade-o¤ that we identify implies that under
optimal policy, in response to country-specic productivity shocks, the relative price gap uctuates
more than it would if there were no nancial frictions. Finally, in response to a purely aggregate
nancial shock that causes an increase in the interest rate spread, the central bank strongly decreases
the deposit rate, which reduces aggregate and distributional ine¢ ciency by mitigating the drop in
output and ination and the rise in relative consumption and prices. We also show that while a
traditional Taylor rule approximates optimal policy quite imperfectly, especially in response to the
nancial shock, a spread-adjusted Taylor rule performs better because it helps the real interest rate
track the e¢ cient rate of interest.
In future work, it would be of interest to consider three particular extensions. First, we have
ignored issues related to the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. We see from our analysis
of optimal monetary policy that the required reduction in the nominal interest rate is quite substantial
when a purely nancial shock hits the economy. A large enough shock of this kind, which will lead to
a substantial drop in the e¢ cient level of the real interest rate, can thus make the zero lower bound
binding in our model and put the currency union in a liquidity trap. This is a situation that is highly
relevant given recent events in the global economy and we can evaluate optimal policy implications
of such a scenario following the pioneering closed-economy work of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
and Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005).
Second, we have focused our analysis solely on monetary policy, thereby not considering the
stabilization role of scal policy and the interactions between monetary and scal policies in a
currency union. Analyzing this dimension of policy can have important implications and we can
consider these issues following the work of, among others, Cooper and Kempf (2004), Beetsma and
Jensen (2005), Kirsanova et al (2007), Gali and Monacelli (2008), Ferrero (2009), Leith and Wren-
Lewis (2011), Farhi, Gopinath, and Itskhoki (2012), and Farhi and Werning (2012).
Third, we have only studied conventional, interest rate based monetary policy in this paper. Given
a series of unconventional monetary policy actions by central banks around the world, including the
European Central Bank, it might be important to extend our analysis along these lines, as illustrated
in closed-economy models by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Curdia and
Woodford (2011), and Del Negro et al (2011). It will be particularly interesting to consider the role
of unconventional monetary policy when the zero lower bound is binding.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in At:
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in As;t:
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in Ab;t:
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in t:
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in At, under optimal policy and
under Taylor rule with alternative degrees of spread adjustment.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in As;t, under optimal policy and
under Taylor rule with alternative degrees of spread adjustment.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in Ab;t, under optimal policy and
under Taylor rule with alternative degrees of spread adjustment.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in t, under optimal policy and
under Taylor rule with alternative degrees of spread adjustment.
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Appendix
A Steady state
This section details a steady-state allocation around which we (log-)linearize the model. For simplicity, we make some
assumptions that deliver a steady state in which allocation is e¢ cient and symmetric across countries except net bond
holding. As mentioned in the main text, the government imposes a proportional tax on sales of goods, which removes
the ine¢ ciency originated from imperfect competition with a constant tax rate,  = 1=. Similarly, the government
receives (or gives) non-state-contingent and non-time-varying international transfers from (to) other countries that
equalizes steady-state consumption and labor hours across countries  despite asymmetric net asset positions.46 In
addition, we assume that the steady-state levels of country-specic productivities are the same across countries and
the credit spread is zero in steady state: specically, As = Ab = A = 1 without loss of generality and  = 0.
Since there are no wasted resources in steady state (  (b) = 0), each countrys consumption is a fraction of
output:
Cs = 
C
s
Y and Cb = 
C
b
Y ; (25)
where nsCs + nb
C
b = 1. In the absence of shocks, household (and government) net asset positions are constant at the
initial condition. We assume without loss of generality that the initial condition are given as bPs; 1  0  bPb; 1 (and
hence bGs; 1  0  bGb; 1).47 This implies that
d = ns

bps + b
G
s

= ns

bPs; 1 + b
G
s; 1

 0,
b =  nb

bPb + b
G
b

=  nb

bPb; 1 + b
G
b; 1

 0:
Given (25), country js production and price in unit of consumption good are given by:
Pj
P
=

Cj
 
1+' Y
+'
1+' ; (26)
n 1j Yj =

Cj
  
1+' Y
1 
1+' : (27)
The steady-state value of relativevariables can be obtained from (25)-(27):
CR =
Cs
Cb
;
PR =

Cs
Cb
 
1+'
;
Y R =
ns
nb

PR
 
=
ns
nb

Cs
Cb
  
1+'
;
NR =

Cs
Cb
  
1+'
:
Aggregate output is in turn obtained as:
Y =
"
ns

Cs
 ( 1)
1+'
+ nb

Cb
 ( 1)
1+'
# 1+'
( 1)(+')
:
From the consumption Euler equations 6 and 5, we obtain the steady state level of the nominal interest rate:
Rd = Rb =  1:
46Pescatori (2012) also uses a similar transfer scheme in a closed economy model with agents that have ex-ante
asymmetric asset positions.
47Here blj  Blj=P for l = P;G and j = s; b.
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Finally, we consider Cs and 
C
b , which depend on net asset positions, the level of production in each country, and
the amount of international transfers. Let us consider household budget constraint (3). In steady state, (3)  after
substituting out lump-sum transfers using (12) is simplied to:
Cs = 
C
s
Y = (1  )

bPs + b
G
s

+
1
ns
Ps
P
Ys + TRs;
Cb = 
C
b
Y = (1  )

bPb + b
G
b

+
1
nb
Pb
P
Yb + TRb:
From the equations above, we can nd the value of TRs (=  nbns TRb) that equalizes steady-state consumption across
countries (Cs = 
C
b = 1):
TRs =   (1  )

bPs + b
G
s

 0;
TRb =   (1  )

bPb + b
G
b

 0:
In this case, the steady-state cross-country distributions are characterized simply as:
CR = PR = NR = 1;
while the size of the economy is normalized to one:
Y = 1:
B Log-linear approximation
We present below the equations characterizing the rst-order approximation of the equilibrium of our model.
 Euler equations:
Y^t = Et[Y^t+1]  1

n
R^dt + nb!^t   Et[t+1]
o
C^Rt = Et[C^
R
t+1] +
1

!^t
 Phillips curves:
s;t = Et [s;t+1] + 
h
Y^t   Y^ Et
i
+ 


 + '
nb
h
C^Rt
i
  

1 + '
 + '
nb
h
P^Rt   P^R;Et
i
b;t = Et [b;t+1] + 
h
Y^t   Y^ Et
i
  


 + '
ns
h
C^Rt
i
+ 

1 + '
 + '
ns
h
P^Rt   P^R;Et
i
 Law of motion for aggregate debt:
b^t = 
 1b^t 1 + 
BR^dt    1B^t    1nsnb (   1) P^Rt    1nsnbC^Rt + (1  nb)B!^t
 Credit spread:
!^t = ^t + B b^t
 Identities:
t = nss;t + nbb;t P^
R
t = P^
R
t 1 + s;t   b;t
 Country-specic consumption:
C^s;t = nbC^
R
t + Y^t C^b;t =  nsC^Rt + Y^t
 Country-specic production:
Y^s;t =  nbP^Rt + Y^t Y^b;t = nsP^Rt + Y^t
 Country-specic net asset position:
b^s;t =
1
ns
b^t b^b;t =   1
nb
b^t
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 Exogenous processes
Y^ Et =
1 + '
 + '

nsA^s;t + nbA^b;t + A^t

P^R;Et =  
1 + '
1 + '

A^s;t   A^b;t

^t = ^t 1 + ";t A^t = AA^t 1 + "A;t
A^s;t = AsA^s;t 1 + "As;t A^b;t = AbA^b;t 1 + "Ab;t
C Proofs
C.1 Proposition 1 (Welfare-theoretic loss function)
We follow Woodford (2003) in deriving the utility-based loss function. We take a Taylor expansion of each term of the
utility function. Taking a second order expansion around the steady state, we obtain
U(Cj;t) = U( C) + UC(Cj;t   C) + 1
2
UCC(Cj;t   C)2 + t:i:p+O
 kk3 (28)
where O
 kk3 represents all relevant terms that are of third or higher order, and t:i:p denotes all the terms independent
of monetary policy. We also take a second order Taylor expansion of Cj;t: Then we have
Cj;t = C

1 + C^j;t +
1
2
C^2j;t

+O
 kk3 (29)
where C^j;t  logCj;t   log C. This implies
Cj;t   C = CC^j;t + 1
2
CC^2j;t +O
 kk3 (30)
Substituting (30) into (28) gives
U(Cj;t) = U( Cj) + UC CC^j;t +
1
2
UC CC^
2
j;t +
1
2
UCC C
2C^2j;t + t:i:p+O
 kk3 (31)
Note that U( C) is independent of monetary policy. We rewrite (31) as
U(Cj;t) = UC C

C^j;t +
1
2
C^2j;t +
1
2
UCC C
UC
C^2j;t

+ t:i:p+O
 kk3 (32)
where t:i:p denotes all the terms independent of monetary policy. From the utility function we assume in the text, we
have UCC
C
UC
=  : Thus we obtain
U(Cj;t) = UC C

C^j;t +
1
2
(1  )C^2j;t

+ t:i:p+O
 kk3
Now we also take a second order Taylor expansion of V (Nj;t(i)) :
V (Nj;t(i)) = V ( N) + VN (Nj;t(i)  N) + VNN (Nj;t(i)  N)2 + t:i:p+O
 kk3 (33)
The second order approximation of Nj;t(i) is:
Nj;t(i)
N
= 1 + N^j;t(i) +
1
2
N^j;t(i)
2 +O
 kk3 (34)
Substituting (34) into (33) gives
V (Nj;t(i)) = VN N

N^j;t(i) +
1
2
N^j;t(i)
2 +
1
2
VNN N
VN
N^j;t(i)
2

+ t:i:p:+O
 kk3 (35)
47
Since VNN
N
VN
= ', we rewrite (35) as
V (Nj;t(i)) = VN N

N^j;t(i) +
1
2
(1 + ')N^j;t(i)
2

+ t:i:p:+O
 kk3 (36)
From the production function, we have
Y^j;t(i) = A^t + A^j;t + N^j;t(i) =) N^j;t(i) = Y^j;t(i)  A^t   A^j;t (37)
Substituting (37) into (36), we obtain
V (Nj;t(i)) = VN N
8><>:
Y^j;t(i)  A^t   A^j;t
+ 1
2
(1 + ')
"
Y^j;t(i)
2 + A^2t + A^
2
j;t
 2A^tY^j;t(i)  2A^j;tY^j;t(i)  2A^tA^j;t
# 9>=>;+ t:i:p:+O  kk3
= VN N
(
Y^j;t(i) +
1
2
(1 + ')Y^j;t(i)
2
 (1 + ')
h
A^tY^j;t(i) + A^j;tY^j;t(i)
i )+ t:i:p:+O  kk3 (38)
By integrating (38), we obtain
1
nj
Z
Ij
V (Nj;t(i)) di = VN N
8<: E
j
i
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
+ 1
2
(1 + ')V arji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
+
1
2
(1 + ')Eji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i2
  (1 + ')

A^t + A^j;t

Eji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
9=; (39)
+ t:i:p:+O
 kk3
Taking a second order approximation of the aggregators gives
Y^j;t(i) = E
j
i
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
+
1
2

   1


V arji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
+O
 kk3 ;
which implies
Eji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
= Y^j;t   1
2

   1


V arji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
+O
 kk3 (40)
Eji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i2
= Y^ 2j;t +O
 kk3 (41)
We substitute (40) and (41) into (39) obtaining
1
nj
Z
Ij
V (Nj;t(i)) di = VN N
8<: Y^j;t +
1
2
(1 + ')Y^ 2j;t   (1 + ')

A^t + A^j;t

Y^j;t
+ 1
2
 
'+  1

V arji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i 9=;
+ t:i:p:+O
 kk3
Now recall that N =
Y
Aj A
= Y . From the households labor supply relation, we have
 VN
UC
=
W
P
= Aj A = 1 =)  VN Y = UC Y = UC C
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Country-j households period utility is then given by
~Uj;t
(
U(Cj;t)  1
nj
Z
Ij
V (Nj;t(i)) di
)
= UC Y

C^j;t +
1
2
(1  )C^2j;t

  UC Y
8<: Y^j;t +
1
2
(1 + ')Y^ 2j;t   (1 + ')

A^t + A^j;t

Y^j;t
+ 1
2
 
'+  1

V arji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i 9=;+ t:i:p:+O  kk3
= UC Y
8><>:
C^j;t +
 
1 
2

C^2j;t
 Y^j;t  
 
1+'
2

Y^ 2j;t + (1 + ')

A^t + A^j;t

Y^j;t
 

'+ 1
2

V arji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
9>=>;+ t:i:p:+O
 kk3
Finally, the weighted sum of period utilities is:
X
j=s;b
nj ~Uj;t
X
j=s;b
(
U(Cj;t)  1
nj
Z
Ij
V (Nj;t(i)) di
)
= UC Y
8<:
P
j

njC^j;t   nj Y^j;t

+
 
1 
2
P
j njC^
2
j;t  
 
1+'
2
P
j nj Y^
2
j;t
+(1 + ')
P
j nj

A^t + A^j;t

Y^j;t  

'+ 1
2
P
j njV ar
j
i
h
Y^j;t(i)
i 9=;
+ t:i:p:+O
 kk3 (42)
= UC Y
8<:
P
j

njC^j;t   nj Y^j;t

+
 
1 
2
P
j njC^
2
j;t  
 
1+'
2
P
j nj Y^
2
j;t
+(1 + ')
P
j nj

A^t + A^j;t

Y^j;t  

'+ 1
2
P
j njV ar
j
i
h
Y^j;t(i)
i 9=;
+ t:i:p:+O
 kk3 (43)
Recall that the economys resource constraint is:
Yt = nsCs;t + nbCb;t + (bt);
which implies:
Y

Yt   Y
Y

= ns C

Cs;t   Cs
Cs

+ nb C

Cb;t   Cb
Cb

+ Y b(b)

bt   b
Y

| {z }+
=0
1
2
Y 2bb(b)

bt   b
Y
2
+O
 kk3 ;
where b(b) is assumed to be zero. This implies
Y^t +
1
2
Y^ 2t = nsC^s;t + nbC^b;t +
1
2

nsC^
2
s;t + nbC^
2
b;t

+
1
2
bbb^
2
t + t:i:p:+O
 kk3
From the demand for sectoral goods, we have
Y^j;t =  

P^j;t   P^t

+ Y^t (44)
The second order expansion of the price aggregator is:
P^t +

1  
2

P^ 2t = nsP^s;t + nbP^b;t +
1  
2

nsP^
2
s;t + nbP^
2
b;t

+O
 kk3 (45)
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Rearranging (45) gives
P^s;t   P^t = nbP^Rt   1  
2

nsP^
2
s;t + nbP^
2
b;t   P^ 2t

+O
 kk3 (46)
P^b;t   P^t =  nsP^Rt   1  
2

nsP^
2
s;t + nbP^
2
b;t   P^ 2t

+O
 kk3 (47)
Also, we have that
P^t = nsP^s;t + nbP^b;t +O
 kk2
=) P^ 2t = n2sP^ 2s;t + n2bP^ 2b;t + 2nsnbP^s;tP^b;t +O
 kk3 (48)
Substituting (48) into (46) and (47), we obtain
P^s;t   P^t = nbP^Rt   nsnb 1  
2

P^Rt
2
+O
 kk3 (49)
P^b;t   P^t =  nsP^Rt   nsnb 1  
2

P^Rt
2
+O
 kk3 (50)
Let us substitute (49) and (50) into (44). Then
Y^s;t =  nbP^Rt + Y^t + nsnb  (1  )
2

P^Rt
2
+O
 kk3 (51)
Y^b;t = nsP^
R
t + Y^t + nsnb
 (1  )
2

P^Rt
2
+O
 kk3 (52)
The equations (51) and (52) imply
Y^ 2s;t =

nbP^
R
t
2
+ Y^ 2t   2nbP^RY^t +O
 kk3
Y^ 2b;t =

nsP^
R
t
2
+ Y^ 2t + 2nsP^
R
t Y^t +O
 kk3
Then, we have
1
UCY
X
j=s;b
nj ~Uj;t =
8<:
P
j

njC^j;t   nj Y^j;t

+
 
1 
2
P
j njC^
2
j;t  
 
1+'
2
P
j nj Y^
2
j;t
+(1 + ')
P
j nj

A^t + A^j;t

Y^j;t  

'+ 1
2
P
j njV ar
j
i
h
Y^j;t(i)
i 9=;
=
8>>><>>>:

1
2
Y^ 2t   2

nsC^
2
s;t + nbC^
2
b;t

  1
2
bbb^
2
t

  nsnb (1 )2

P^Rt
2
    1+'
2

nsnb
2

P^Rt
2
    1+'
2

Y^ 2t
+(1 + ')

A^t + nsA^s;t + nbA^b;t

Y^t + (1 + ')nsnb

A^b;t   A^s;t

P^Rt
 

'+ 1
2
P
j njV ar
j
i
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
9>>>=>>>;
=
8>><>>:
 nsnb 2

C^s;t   C^b;t
2
  nsnb
 
1+'
2
 
P^Rt
2
   +'
2

Y^ 2t   12 bbb^2t
+(1 + ')

A^t + nsA^s;t + nbA^b;t

Y^t + (1 + ')nsnb

A^b;t   A^s;t

P^Rt
 

'+ 1
2
P
j njV ar
j
i
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
9>>=>>; ; (53)
where the terms t:i:p:+O
 kk3 were omitted. Note that
A^t + nsA^s;t + nbA^b;t =

 + '
1 + '

Y^ Et +O
 kk2 (54)
A^b;t   A^s;t =

1 + '
1 + '

P^R;Et +O
 kk2 (55)
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Substituting (54) and (55) into (53) gives
1
UCY
X
j=s;b
nj ~Uj;t =  nsnb 
2

C^s;t   C^b;t
2
 
 + '
2

Y^ 2t + ( + ') Y^
E
t Y^t
+ nsnb (1 + ') P^
R;E
t P^
R
t   nsnb

1 + '
2

P^Rt
2
  1
2
bbb^
2
t
 

'+  1
2
X
j
njV ar
j
i
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
+ t:i:p:+O
 kk3
=  nsnb 
2

C^Rt
2
   + '
2

Y^ 2t   2Y^ Et Y^t +

Y^ Et
2
 

Y^ Et
2
  nsnb 1 + '
2

P^Rt
2
  2P^R;Et P^Rt +

P^R;Et
2
 

P^R;Et
2
  1
2
bbb^
2
t
 

'+  1
2
X
j
njV ar
j
i
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
+ t:i:p:+O
 kk3
Since

Y^ Et
2
and

P^R;Et
2
belong to t:i:p, we obtain
X
j=s;b
nj ~Uj;t =  UCY
2
24 nsnb C^Rt 2 + ( + ')Y^t   Y^ Et 2 + nsnb (1 + ')P^Rt   P^R;Et 2
+bbb^
2
t +
 
'+  1
P
j njV ar
j
i
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
35
+ t:i:p:+O
 kk3
The demand for Yj;t(i) is given by
Yj;t(i) =

Pj;t(i)
Pj;t
  
Pj;t
Pt
 
Yt
Then
Y^j;t(i) =  

P^j;t(i)  P^j;t

  

P^j;t   P^t

+ Y^t
This implies that
V arji
h
Y^j;t(i)
i
= 2V arji
h
P^j;t(i)
i
where jt  V arji
h
P^j;t(i)
i
is a measure of price dispersion within a country. When prices are staggered as in the
discrete time Calvo fashion, Woodford (2003) has shown that
jt = j
j
t 1 +
j
1  j 
2
j;t +O
 kk3 =)
= t+1j 
j
 1 +
tX
k=0
t sj

j
1  j

2j;k +O
 kk3
If a new policy is conducted from t > 0, the rst term, t+1j 
j
 1; is independent of policy. If we take the discounted
sum over time, we obtain
1X
t=0
tjt =
j
(1  j)(1  j)
1X
t=0
t2j;t + t:i:p:+O
 kk3
Now, consider
1X
t=0
t
X
j=s;b
nj ~Uj;t
51
=  UC
Y
2
1X
t=0
t

nsnb

C^Rt
2
+ ( + ')

Y^t   Y^ Et
2
+ nsnb (1 + ')

P^Rt   P^R;Et
2
+ bbb^
2
t

  UC
Y
2
 
'+  1

2
X
j=s;b
nj
1X
t=0
tjt + t:i:p:+O
 kk3
=  UC
Y
2
1X
t=0
t

nsnb

C^Rt
2
+ ( + ')

Y^t   Y^ Et
2
+ nsnb (1 + ')

P^Rt   P^R;Et
2
+ bbb^
2
t

  UC
Y
2
1X
t=0
t
X
j=s;b
nj
j (1 + ')
(1  j)(1  j)
2
j;t + t:i:p:+O
 kk3
=  UC
Y
2
1X
t=0
t
264 Pj=s;b nj (+')yj 2j;t + nsnb

C^Rt
2
+ ( + ')

Y^t   Y^ Et
2
+nsnb (1 + ')

P^Rt   P^R;Et
2
+ bbb^
2
t
375+ t:i:p:+O  kk3
Therefore
Lt = ns
 ( + ')
s
2s;t + nb
 ( + ')
b
2b;t
+ nsnb

C^Rt
2
+ ( + ')

Y^t   Y^ Et
2
+ nsnb (1 + ')

P^Rt   P^R;Et
2
+ bbb^
2
t :
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
It is straightforward to take the derivatives.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
(a) As discussed in the previous section, it is clear that the system of the equations, (14)-(19), determines
n
C^Rt ; P^
R
t ; Y^
R
t ; bt
o
as a function of ^t and P^
R;E
t (only) in the limiting case, bb ! 0 and B ! 0.
(b) The loss function (21) can be written as
Lt = 
2
t + Y

Y^t   Y^ Et
2
+ nsnb

Rt
2
+ P

P^Rt   P^R;Et
2
+ C

C^Rt
2
+ B b^
2
t ;
where  =
(+')

. Note that nsnb
 
Rt
2
+ P

P^Rt   P^R;Et
2
+ C

C^Rt
2
are independent of monetary policy
and B = 0 when bb = 0.
(c) From (14), the central bank can set t = 0 and Y^t = Y^ Et , which minimizes the loss function.
(d) Finally, to show that the optimal monetary policy does not attain the e¢ cient outcome, note that
nsP^
R
t = nsP^
R
t 1 + t   b;t:
Suppose the optimal policy leads to the e¢ cient outcome. Then it must be that
b;t =  ns

P^R;Et   P^R;Et 1

:
Then one can easily show using a countrys Phillips curve that C^Rt 6= 0, which contradicts the supposition.
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C.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Under exible prices ( = 1), the rst two ination terms drop out from (21). Moreover, since Y^t = Y^ Et , this third
term drops out as well. This means that the loss function now simplies to:
Lt = P

P^Rt   P^R;Et
2
+ C

C^Rt
2
+ B b^
2
t ;
where
P = nsnb (1 + ') ; C = nsnb; B = bb:
Next, note the relationship between P^Rt   P^R;Et and C^Rt given in (20). Using this we can rewrite the loss function as
Lt =
 
P


1 + '
2
+ C
!
| {z }
=~C

C^Rt
2
+ B b^
2
t ;
with the following reduced system of equations as constraints:
C^Rt = Et[C^
R
t+1] +
1


^t + B b^t

; (56)
b^t = 
 1b^t 1 + 
BR^dt    1B^t    1nsnb

 (   1)
1 + '
+ 1

C^Rt (57)
+ (1  nb)B

^t + B b^t

   1nsnb (   1)

1 + '
1 + '

A^s;t   A^b;t

;
Y^ Et = EtY^
E
t+1   1

n
R^dt   Ett+1 + nb

^t + B b^t
o
: (58)
The rst order conditions from the central banks minimization problem under commitment are given as:
0 = ~CC^
R
t + q1;t    1q1;t 1 +  1nsnb

 (   1)
1 + '
+ 1

q2;t;
0 = B b^t   1

Bq1;t + (1  (1  nb)BB)q2;t   Etq2;t+1 + 1

nbBq3;t;
0 =  1Bq2;t    1 1

q3;t 1;
0 =  Bq2;t + 1

q3;t;
where fq1;tg, fq2;tg and fq3;tg are the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated respectively with (56), (57) and (58).
The last two equations implies that q2;t = q3;t = 0. It is then straightforward to show that the rst order conditions
are reduced to a simple targeting rule:
~CC^
R
t =  B 
B
h
b^t    1b^t 1
i
=  
h
b^t    1b^t 1
i
:
We can plug the targeting rule into (56) to obtain:
Etb^t+1  

1 +  + B
~C
B

b^t + b^t 1 =
~C
B
^t:
The solution of the second order di¤erence equation is:
b^t = b^t 1   
~C
B
^t;
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and we thus have:
~CC^
R
t =  B 
B
h
b^t    1b^t 1
i
= 
 
 1    b^t 1 +  ~C
B
^t

=) C^Rt =  (1  )~C
b^t 1 + 

B
^t;
where  2 (0; 1) is a smaller root of the characteristic polynomial:
f () = 2  

1 +  + B
~C
B

 + 1 = 0:
In particular,  is given as
 =

1 +  + B
~C
B

 
r
1 +  + B
~C
B
2
  4
2
:
Since C^Rt 6= 0, the optimal policy does not achieve the e¢ ciency.
D Optimal policy problem in general case
In this section, we detail optimal policy problem. Consider the Lagrangian (omitting exogenous shocks for brevity):
L =1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

s
2
s;t + b
2
b;t + Y

Y^t   Y^ Et
2
+ P

P^Rt   P^R;Et
2
+ C

C^Rt
2
+ B b^
2
t

+ E0
1X
t=0
tq1;t

s;t   s;t+1   s
h
Y^t   Y^ Et
i
  s


 + '
nb
h
C^Rt
i
+ s

1 + '
 + '
nb
h
P^Rt   P^R;Et
i
+ E0
1X
t=0
tq2;t

b;t   b;t+1   b
h
Y^t   Y^ Et
i
+ b


 + '
ns
h
C^Rt
i
  b

1 + '
 + '
ns
h
P^Rt   P^R;Et
i
+ E0
1X
t=0
tq3;t
n
P^Rt   P^R;Et

 

P^Rt 1   P^R;Et 1

  s;t + b;t
o
+ E0
1X
t=0
tq4;t

C^Rt   Et[C^Rt+1]  1

B b^t

+ E0
1X
t=0
tq5;t

Y^t   Y^ Et

 

Y^t+1   Y^ Et+1

+
1

R^dt +
1

nbB b^t   1

nss;t+1   1

nbb;t+1

+ E0
1X
t=0
tq6;t
(  
1  (1  nb)BB

b^t    1b^t 1   BR^dt +  1B [nss;t + nbb;t]
+ 1nsnb (   1)

P^Rt   P^R;Et

+  1nsnbC^Rt
)
;
where fq1;tg, fq2;tg,..., fq6;tg are the sequence of Lagrange multipliers.
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First order conditions are given as:
@s;t : 0 = ss;t + q1;t   q1;t 1   q3;t    1 1

nsq5;t 1 + 
 1Bnsq6;t
@b;t : 0 = bb;t + q2;t   q2;t 1 + q3;t    1 1

nbq5;t 1 + 
 1Bnbq6;t
@

Y^t   Y^ Et

: 0 = Y

Y^t   Y^ Et

  sq1;t   bq2;t + q5;t    1q5;t 1
@

P^Rt   P^R;Et

: 0 = P

P^Rt   P^R;Et

+ s

1 + '
 + '
nb

q1;t   b

1 + '
 + '
ns

q2;t
+ q3;t   Etq3;t+1 +  1nsnb (   1) q6;t
@C^Rt : 0 = CC^
R
t   s


 + '
nb

q1;t + b


 + '
ns

q2;t + q4;t    1q4;t 1 +  1nsnbq6;t
@b^t : 0 = bbb^t   1

Bq4;t +
1

nbBq5;t +

1  (1  nb)BB

q6;t   Etq6;t+1
@R^dt : 0 =
1

q5;t   Bq6;t:
Consequently, the equilibrium time path ofn
Y^t; R^
d
t ; t; s;t; b;t; b^t; !^t; C^
R
t ; P^
R
t ; q1;t; q2;t; q3;t; q4;t; q5;t; q6;t
o1
t=0
are characterized by the following 15 equations
s;t = Et [s;t+1] + s
h
Y^t   Y^ Et
i
+ s


 + '
nb
h
C^Rt
i
  s

1 + '
 + '
nb
h
P^Rt   P^R;Et
i
;
b;t = Et [b;t+1] + b
h
Y^t   Y^ Et
i
  b


 + '
ns
h
C^Rt
i
+ b

1 + '
 + '
ns
h
P^Rt   P^R;Et
i
;
Y^t = Et[Y^t+1]  1

n
R^dt + nb!^t   Et[t+1]
o
;
C^Rt = Et[C^
R
t+1] +
1

!^t;
b^t = 
 1b^t 1 + 
BR^dt    1B^t    1nsnb (   1) P^Rt    1nsnbC^Rt + (1  nb)B!^t;
!^t = ^t + B b^t;
P^Rt = P^
R
t 1 + s;t   b;t;
t = nss;t + nbb;t;
0 = ss;t + q1;t   q1;t 1   q3;t    1 1

nsq5;t 1 + 
 1Bnsq6;t;
0 = bb;t + q2;t   q2;t 1 + q3;t    1 1

nbq5;t 1 + 
 1Bnbq6;t;
0 = Y

Y^t   Y^ Et

  sq1;t   bq2;t + q5;t    1q5;t 1;
0 = P

P^Rt   P^R;Et

+ s

1 + '
 + '
nb

q1;t   b

1 + '
 + '
ns

q2;t + q3;t   Etq3;t+1 +  1nsnb (   1) q6;t;
0 = CC^
R
t   s


 + '
nb

q1;t + b


 + '
ns

q2;t + q4;t    1q4;t 1 +  1nsnbq6;t;
0 = bbb^t   1

Bq4;t +
1

nbBq5;t +

1  (1  nb)BB

q6;t   Etq6;t+1; and
0 =
1

q5;t   Bq6;t;
given exogenous processes and initial conditions. We assume that all the variables are in the steady state initially:
Z^ 1 = 0 and q 1 = 0.
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E Estimation of B and productivity shock processes
Below we detail the estimation strategy that we used to estimate B = bb= and the parameters related to the
productivity shocks.
E.1 Estimation of B
The parameter B implies a change in !^t associated with a unit change in b^t while all other variables are xed. We set
B at the long-run impact of a unit increase in the net foreign asset-to-GDP ratio on the interest rate spread estimated
using a panel of the seven countries in Table 1 (France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). The
panel consists of annual data on interest rate spreads (the excess return of the 10-year government bond over EONIA
or the Euro OverNight Index Average) and the ratio of net foreign asset to output for each country over the period
from 2007 through 2010. The estimated long-run impact is 0.11.
E.2 Estimation of productivity shocks
Our model implies that
A^t + A^s;t = Y^s;t   N^s;t
A^t + A^b;t = Y^b;t   N^b;t
where
A^t = AA^t 1 + "A;t;
A^s;t = AsA^s;t 1 + "As;t;
A^b;t = AbA^b;t 1 + "Ab;t;
and the innovations "A;t, "As;t and "Ab;t are i.i.d. and have mean zero and variance 2A, 
2
AS
and 2Ab , respectively.
For simplicity, we further assume that the country-specic shocks follow the same process: As = Ab = Ai and
2As = 
2
Ab = 
2
Ai:
To calibrate the parameters, we use the quarterly per-capita output data of six countries (France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain) over the period from 2000 through 2011 and estimate the following model
Zi;t = Zi + g  t+ A^t + A^i;t;
and
A^t = AA^t 1 + "A;t;
A^i;t = AiA^i;t 1 + "Ai;t;
for i = 1; 2;    ; 10 where Zi;t is per-capita output in each country, "A;t  N
 
0; 2A

and "Ai;t  N
 
0; 2Ai

. The
data were taken from the OECD database. Note that the country-specic productivity shocks are restricted so that
they have the same autocorrelation coe¢ cient and the same innovation variance. We include Zi and g  t to demean
per-capita output and remove a common linear time trend.
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods with a quite loose prior distribution. In particular, we use a
uniform distribution over (0; 1) for A and Ai and a uniform distribution over [0; 0:2] for A and Ai . The posterior
mean is estimated to be 0.73 and 0.98 for A and Ai , respectively, and 0.002 and 0.009 for A and Ai , respectively.
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F Additional gures
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to an expansionary monetary shock. Monetary policy is a standard
Taylor rule with an i.i.d shock and no interest smoothing term: R^dt = t + yY^t + "R;t. Wealth
redistributioncorresponds to the special case that features only the wealth redistribution channel
due to the absence of nominal rigidities, while Aggregate demandcorresponds to the other special
case that features only the aggregate demand channel.
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